

JOURNAL OF
UKRAINIAN
S·T·U·D·I·E·S

27

SUMMER 1990

CONTRIBUTORS:

BOHDAN KRAWCHENKO

MYROSLAV SHKANDRIJ

ANNA MAKOLKINA

ROMAN SOLCHANYK

ALEXANDRA KRUCHKA-GLYNN



Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2016

JOURNAL OF UKRAINIAN STUDIES

VOLUME 15, NUMBER 1 SUMMER 1990

CONTRIBUTORS:

Bohdan Krawchenko

Myroslav Shkandrij

Anna Makolkina

Roman Solchanyk

Alexandra Kruchka-Glynn

MANAGING EDITOR

David R. Marples

EDITORIAL BOARD

Jurij Dobczansky, Library of Congress

Natalia Kononenko-Moyle, University of Virginia

Leonid Leshchenko, Ukrainian Academy of Sciences

James E. Mace, U.S. Commission on the Ukrainian Famine

Natalia Pylypiuk, Harvard University

David Saunders, University of Newcastle Upon Tyne

Roman Solchanyk, Radio Liberty

Danylo Struk, University of Toronto

Frances Swyripa, University of Alberta

John Tedstrom, Institute for East-West Security Studies

Ze'ev Wolfson, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

The *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* is published semiannually in the summer and winter by the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, University of Alberta. Annual subscription rates are \$15.00 for individuals and \$20.00 for libraries and institutions. Cheques and money orders are payable in Canadian or American funds only to the *Journal of Ukrainian Studies*. Please do not send cash. Subscribers outside Canada should pay in US funds.

The *Journal* publishes articles on Ukrainian and Ukrainian Canadian studies, with emphasis on the modern period. It also publishes discussions, book reviews, and journalistic articles of a controversial or problem-oriented nature. Ideally, those wishing to submit articles should first send a letter of inquiry, with a brief abstract of the article to the managing editor at CIUS, 352 Athabasca Hall, University of Alberta, Edmonton, Alberta, T6G 2E8. Fax (403) 492-4967.

Copyright © Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1990.

Editorial assistance on this issue provided by Linda Distad. Roman Solchanyk's article is reprinted with permission from *Radio Liberty's Report on the USSR*, April 20, 1990.

Printed by The Typeworks, Vancouver.

Publication of this issue of the *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* has been made possible by a generous grant from the Stasiuk Endowment, contributed to the Program for the Study of Contemporary Ukraine, Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies.

Contents

Articles

Bohdan Krawchenko, National Memory in Ukraine:
The Role of the Blue and Yellow Flag 1

Myroslav Shkandrij,
Prague as a Resource for the Study of Ukrainian Literature 22

Anna Makolkina,
The Dance of Dionysos in H. Khodkevych and D. H. Lawrence 31

Roman Solchanyk,
An Interview with Stanislav V. Kulchyts'kyi 39

Alexandra Kruchka Glynn,
Reintroducing Vera Lysenko—Ukrainian Canadian Author 53

Book Reviews

Norman Hillmer, et al., *On Guard for Thee: War, Ethnicity,
and the Canadian State 1939-1945* (Thomas M. Prymak) 71

Ukrainians in Ontario, ed. L. Y. Luciuk and I. L. Wynnyckyj
(Frances Swyripa) 73

Lubomyr Y. Luciuk and Bohdan S. Kordan, *Creating a Landscape:
A Geography of Ukrainians in Canada* (Manoly R. Lupul) 75

Pavlo Zaitsev, *Taras Shevchenko* (Jaroslav Rozumnyj) 77

Zenon E. Kohut, *Russian Centralism and Ukrainian Autonomy:
Imperial Absorption of the Hetmanate 1760s-1830s* (Edward C. Thaden) 79

Jane Ellis, *The Russian Orthodox Church: A Contemporary History*
(Andrii Krawchuk) 82

List of Contributors 87

National Memory in Ukraine: The Role of the Blue and Yellow Flag

The rapid disappearance of national memory, Pierre Nora has noted, beckons scholars to do an inventory of the places (*lieux*) which selectively incarnate that memory.¹ While this is an appropriate framework for research in countries such as France, a different approach would be more useful in the case of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. In Ukraine, the largest non-Russian republic in the USSR, the Soviet regime has for over half a century gone to great efforts to eradicate not only national memory, but also the places which could crystallize a recollection of the past. So an inventory of existing places of Ukrainian national memory would be a short one.² Because the places of memory are so few and far between, the unfolding national movement in Ukraine has had to reestablish vessels of a commemorative consciousness. Thus, perhaps the most interesting focus for a study of Ukraine is on the process of the birth of new places of memory. Here we are dealing with a very recent development, whose history really begins only in 1989, with the rise of "informal" or independent cultural and political groups and associations which have developed places of memory and campaigned vigorously to invest them with symbolic power. In this respect, perhaps the most remarkable new development is the reappearance of the blue and yellow flag, the "national flag." Our paper will concentrate on this flag and will discuss the nature of the campaign which was unleashed to prohibit its use, as well as the changing meaning of this powerful metaphor.

In Central and Eastern Ukraine, which have been part of the Soviet Union since its inception, memory of the blue and yellow flag had largely

vanished from popular consciousness. These were the colors of the armies supporting the Ukrainian People's Republic which were defeated by the Bolshevik forces, and the blue and yellow had not been seen again since 1920. Even during the national revival of the 1960s, this symbol was not used. As an organizer of the Popular Movement for Restructuring in Ukraine—Rukh—in Kirovohrad recently noted, "I do not worry about the blue and yellow flag . . . simply because I never in my life saw it, and make no associations with it." And he was the son of a machine-gunner of a regiment of the Ukrainian national army which fought under the blue and yellow flag during the Civil War.³ For a population brutalized by Stalin's terror, "in the 1960s, when all around us Ukrainian language schools were being closed, there were more useful things to do than antagonize the regime with a flag whose significance only the KGB would have understood," said a Kiev activist of Rukh.⁴

In Western Ukraine, on the other hand, under Polish rule in the inter-war period, the blue and yellow flag was permitted and was used widely during holidays and anniversaries. When Soviet armies occupied Western Ukraine, some villages were naive enough to welcome the representatives of the new order with "bread and salt, and blue and yellow flags . . . which ended tragically for the organizers of these encounters: shortly thereafter all of them were repressed by the Stalinist regime."⁵ By the late 1950s, following the bloody campaign to root out the Ukrainian nationalist underground movement, there were only isolated instances of the hoisting of the blue and yellow flag as a sign of protest. The long prison terms which were given to anyone caught perpetrating this act—which was considered synonymous with sabotage—served as a real deterrent to any visible manifestation of the banner.

The reappearance of the blue and yellow flag in public life in Ukraine coincides with the rise of "informal" or independent groups and associations, and with the holding of mass meetings and demonstrations which provided venues for it to be flown. In Ukraine, the new opposition movement began to develop only in 1987, following the release of many Ukrainian political prisoners under the amnesty of that year.⁶ The growth of the national movement in Ukraine was certainly faced with more difficulties than its counterparts in the Baltic republics. In Ukraine, the arch-conservative Brezhnevist party apparatus, whose leader Volodymyr Shcherbytsky was retired from office only in September 1989, fought the opposition currents tooth and nail. For example, public meetings held in

Lviv, Western Ukraine, in the summer of 1988 were brutally suppressed. In Kiev, police viciously attacked groups participating in the April 1988 ecological meeting commemorating the second anniversary of Chernobyl. Until recently the beating up of individual opposition figures by the militia and the KGB was a common occurrence. Nonetheless, the movement had built up a head of steam. A major catalyst in this development was the campaign for the March 1989 elections to the Congress of People's Deputies, with its mass mobilizations to ensure the victory of progressive candidates and encouragement of voters to cross out the names of unpopular candidates or those running unopposed. It was only when a significant mass movement had established itself that activists appeared in the streets with the blue and yellow flag.

In the spring of 1989 the national movement began to develop as a mass phenomenon in Western Ukraine, and with it "a genuine flowing of the blue and yellow flag."⁷ During countless village and town meetings called by Rukh or the Shevchenko Ukrainian Language Society or at demonstrations supporting the rehabilitation of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, the blue and yellow flag was flown, and speakers from the Ukrainian Helsinki Union and other independent groups urged the adoption of this national symbol.⁸ Pins with the blue and yellow colors, produced by artisans, were sold openly at meetings. Despite harassment from the militia, wearing the pin became increasingly popular, especially with youth.⁹ The first occasion when blue and yellow flags were unfurled en masse was at the April 26, 1989 mass meeting in Lviv, marking the third anniversary of the Chernobyl nuclear disaster. During the May Day celebrations, unofficial groups in Lviv formed three columns and marched down Lenin Prospekt carrying blue and yellow flags, and battled with the police who tried to confiscate them. The police attacks incensed the population. On May 3, 1989 a mass meeting in Lviv "pronounced the will of the people by adopting the following resolution: 'From this day on, this meeting considers the blue and yellow flag the national flag'."¹⁰

In Eastern Ukraine, the use of the flag was much more circumspect. It was seen in Kiev on May 22, 1989, during ceremonies held in front of the Shevchenko monument to mark the end of the All-Union Taras Shevchenko commemorations. This resulted in the arrest of six people.¹¹ On that occasion thirteen flags were flown. Hitherto, there were only isolated instances of the raising of individual flags. In Kiev, a single flag appeared at an ecological meeting in the winter of 1988. This was the first recorded

appearance of the flag in the city in recent memory.¹² But even this modest manifestation of the flag sowed panic in the party apparatus, and Kiev newspapers attacked those who carried the banner.¹³

The organizers of these initial actions involving the flag were probably the Ukrainian Helsinki Union (now called the Ukrainian Republican Party), and the Ukrainian People's Democratic League, two of the more militant groups within the national movement. These groups were led by former political prisoners, and their membership was drawn from what could be called the marginal elements of society, that is people unafraid of losing their jobs. The groups also included many young people. The mainstream intelligentsia in the leadership of groups such as the Shevchenko Ukrainian Language Society, Rukh, Memorial or the ecological movement, Green World, did not play an active role in propagating the use of the flag. In fact, at this stage many argued that using the flag was a tactical mistake, since outside Western Ukraine people would not identify with this symbol, and its display might threaten the unity of the opposition. Moreover, the party apparatus was a formidable foe; to make enemies over questions of symbolic significance, when there were so many substantive issues to deal with, was a political error.¹⁴

The party leadership of the Ukrainian SSR was alarmed by the growing popularity of the blue and yellow flag, and backed up repressive measures with a propaganda campaign in the mass media aimed at discrediting the symbol. The major thrust of this offensive was to argue that the blue and yellow flag was never the national symbol of Ukraine, and those who sought its lineage in Kievan Rus' or the Cossack period were engaged in wishful thinking. The blue and yellow colors were popular only in Western Ukraine, and hence could never serve as a symbol for the whole republic. In the twentieth century, the blue and yellow colors became "the flag of political bankruptcy": the standard of political forces defeated by the Bolsheviks during the civil war. It was claimed that as the banner of "the Banderites" (the wing of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists which supported Stepan Bandera) it was further compromised. Thus, "The blue and yellow was not a symbol of a national group, but of an ideology." Playing on the insecurity of the population arising from rising social tensions, the party warned that "a revival of the flag in the contemporary period serves the purpose of those who wish to revive confrontation, and the psychological conditions of civil war."¹⁵ It was suggested that not all who carried the blue and yellow flag were "nationalist."¹⁶ "Extrem-

ists" were simply manipulating crowds who saw the flag as symbolic of an end "to our indifference to the past."¹⁷ People were simply ignorant of the real meaning of the symbolism, and have "even taken to wearing blue and yellow pins, together with pins of Lenin."¹⁸

Despite this concerted effort to vilify the flag, its popularity increased. Spurred by the example of the Baltic republics, where national flags dominated all public meetings, the drive of Western Ukrainians to assert their national symbols reached campaign proportions during the summer of 1989. At a mass meeting on June 18, 1989 in Ivano-Frankivsk at the grave site of the Sich Sharpshooters (a Western Ukrainian unit which fought for Ukraine's independence) and victims of Stalinist terror, "Hundreds of large and small blue and yellow flags floated in the air . . . and next to them proudly took their place the national flags of Estonia and Georgia." As *Viche*, an unofficial bulletin reported:

Tears tumbled from the eyes of old Hutsuls and young Pokutians. The calloused hands of women, shaking, touched the sacred artifacts of Ukraine—their lips kissed the silk of the blue and yellow standards. . . . This is an answer to all who question whether or not the Ukrainian people need their symbols. Understand, it is not the Ukrainian bourgeois, whom you / the Party / constantly invoke, which cries at the loss of sacred national symbols, but the workers of Ivano-Frankivsk, Dolyna, and Kalush, and the peasants of Koshiv and Rohatyn.¹⁹

In Kiev the flag's visibility increased with the rise of Rukh. Thus on July 2, 1989, blue and yellow colors were prominently displayed at a public meeting called in support of the slogan "All Power to the Soviets" following the Kiev regional conference of Rukh, and attended by 20,000 people.²⁰

By the summer of 1989 the flag was well on its way to becoming entrenched in Western Ukraine as the national symbol. Unofficial groups such as the Ukrainian Helsinki Union, or the Lev student organization, ignored the arguments of the "reasonable" intelligentsia, and continued to propagate the flag. Their actions found resonance among the masses. Unable to stop the use of the flag by force, the Lviv oblast party committee appears to have asked the central leadership to strike a compromise and allow the blue and yellow colors to fly beside the official symbol of the republic—the red and blue flag with a hammer and sickle.²¹ In other re-

gions of Ukraine the flag was still a rarity and was virtually unseen in the industrial areas. Apparently flooded with requests for a policy on the flag, the party felt that an authoritative, firm statement at this point would contain the spread of the flag's use. The Commission on Patriotic and International Education and International Relations of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet was mandated to examine the issue. It delivered its report in July 1989; the report was uncompromising.

The various experts who testified before the Commission repeated arguments which had been heard before: there was no legitimate historical basis to consider blue and yellow the national colors of Ukraine. The flag surfaced during the "bourgeois-national liberation movement in Western Ukraine in the mid-nineteenth century," and was based on the colors of the coat of arms of the Galician-Volhynian principedom. The flag was used by the opponents of Soviet power during the revolution, and was associated with "grief and bloodshed." The decision of the Central Rada of the Ukrainian People's Republic to adopt the blue and yellow colors as the state flag was taken by "a narrow circle of individuals [forty-eight people] . . . and could not be considered an expression of the will of the population." The red color had deep roots in the traditions of the republic as the symbol of revolution, the international proletariat, and socialist construction, and had woven itself into the life of the republic. In a curious and conciliatory tone, it was pointed out that all the dominant colors of Ukraine were in fact combined in the official flag of the republic: red and blue, and the hammer and sickle was after all yellow. (The blue stripe was added to the red flag in 1949.) A dissenting voice came from the First Secretary of the Writers' Union of Ukraine, Iu. M. Mushketyk, who suggested that while the red flag should remain the state flag, "national symbolism" should also be permitted.

The secretary for ideology in the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, L. M. Kravchuk, had the last word. He noted that the official flag combined all colors. But that was not the issue. There was a more significant "political question": "Some groups and information associations with a political orientation choose the blue and yellow colors not by accident. . . . This is nostalgia for an independent, united Ukraine. Those who choose the blue and yellow flag proclaim clearly that they are for separation from the Soviet Union." He warned that the blue and yellow flag would not be allowed, and its further use would "lead to a sharpening of the socio-political situation, of inter-ethnic relations in the

republic.”²² The regulation passed by the Commission reaffirmed the red flag as the symbol of the Ukrainian SSR and urged a campaign to cultivate respect for this color. The blue and yellow flag was condemned as “the symbol of the struggle for the interests of bourgeois and petty-bourgeois nationalist layers.” All community, political, and cultural events in Ukraine could display only the red flag.²³

Party and state strictures on the use of the blue and yellow flag, backed up with arrests and fines for those violating regulations, would normally have cowed people into submission. But in Ukraine, as elsewhere in the Soviet Union, opposition to the party bureaucracy was growing daily, spurred by a serious economic, social, and ecological crisis which fueled demands for radical political democratization and an assertion of the republic’s sovereignty. The regime could issue orders, but they were no longer being obeyed.

Symptomatic of the new situation in Ukraine was the fact that during the Commission’s debate on the flag, members of the Ukrainian People’s Democratic League held a hunger strike on the steps of the Supreme Soviet in Kiev to protest the Commission’s findings.²⁴ In Lviv, on August 3, 1989, a meeting attended by 80,000 people sent the following telegram to the Commission:

We oppose categorically the politically harmful and historically illiterate evaluation of national symbols. . . . We demand an end to the obscene attack by the mass media and officialdom on that which is sacred to the Ukrainian people—the national flag. . . . We see in this a very conscious attempt to raise tensions in Ukraine, and a sinister effort to deflect the attention of the public from the resolution of the most pressing social and economic problems.²⁵

The party’s campaign against the flag often produced the opposite result. For example, activists of Rukh in the southern Russified city of Kherson, when confronted with a dire shortage of unofficial information bulletins, circulated copies of the most vitriolic articles which appeared in conservative newspapers, such as *Pravda Ukrainy*: if “they” are opposed to something, then chances are it must be good, was the reasoning.²⁶ The publicity given to the flag in the official media aroused everyone’s curiosity. Symbols, like religion, suffer above all from neglect. A group of Kiev University students who organized a “cultural-agitation march” through

Shevchenko's ancestral homeland (an activity which had become popular with many youth groups in the summer of 1989), found that people had become fascinated with the flag. The militia in particular was anxious to see the blue and yellow colors, which the official propaganda campaign had endowed with the ominous powers of a totem. Looking at the flag, one militiaman remarked, "Imagine, just ordinary silk. There is nothing terrible. What is there to be afraid of?"²⁷

The national movement had to respond directly to the arguments advanced by the Commission. The rebuttals generated much interesting research, never before published in Soviet Ukraine, on the origins of the blue and yellow flag. Several studies appeared in the mainstream press, and unofficial publications carried numerous articles on this score. Affirming the long historical lineage of the blue and yellow colors did much to remove the psychological barriers which came from the close identification of the flag with the military forces of the Bolsheviks' direct opponents.

The studies showed that the origins of the blue and yellow colors lay in the coat of arms of the thirteenth-century Galician-Volhynian princedom (which incorporated the Kiev region): the gold lion on an azure background. (Some evidence suggested even earlier use.) While the dominant color of the Cossack period was crimson (traced to Polish influence), blue and yellow combinations were quite common, especially during the mid-seventeenth-century uprisings led by Bohdan Khmelnytsky. In the eighteenth century blue and yellow was widely used by Cossack regiments in left-bank Ukraine. The flag became the symbol of the 1848 revolution in Austrian-ruled Galicia. Because Galicia was the Ukrainian Piedmont, the use of the flag spread to Russian-ruled Ukraine. It surfaced in the 1905 revolution. Following the February 1917 revolution the blue and yellow flag flew at numerous mass meetings. Thus the adoption of the colors as the official flag of the Ukrainian People's Republic on January 14, 1918 (before the outbreak of hostilities with the Bolsheviks) was hardly an arbitrary act. The symbol was truly all-Ukrainian since the Western Ukrainian People's Republic also proclaimed the blue and yellow its flag on November 13, 1918.

The flag was considered national even in the early years of Soviet power. For instance, blue and yellow flags were flown during Shevchenko memorial days in Kiev in 1919, and in Odessa in 1920. And it was pointed out with considerable relish that contrary to official propaganda

the flag of the Bandera faction of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists was not blue and yellow, but red and black.²⁸

To a bystander, the finer points of the debate on the flag would appear somewhat ludicrous. Counting the number of times blue and yellow combinations appeared on Cossack ensigns, or in old drawings of Cossack uniforms, or citing every mention of these colors in old chronicles, would appear to be somewhat obscurantist. But it was a necessary exercise in order to show that blue and yellow colors were part of the memory of the Ukrainian people. As Bohdan Iakymovych concluded, "We have to clearly recognize that historical symbolism is above all a memorial of the Ukrainian people, and we have to approach it from this angle."²⁹ Andrii Hrechylo suggested that despite sharp historical discontinuities, "at critical historic turning points" (the Khmelnytsky uprising, the 1848 and 1917 revolutions), the "blue and yellow flag, created by the people themselves . . . emerged as a symbol of the struggle for social and economic justice."³⁰ The symbols, wrote one political writer, "came to us from the depth of the centuries," and another noted, they serve as a link "to the glory of our ancestors."³¹

It would be tempting to take these assertions of the primeval, almost mystical qualities of the blue and yellow colors as merely a political metaphor for Ukraine's claims to sovereignty and independence. It would, however, be a mistake to treat them only as such. The fascination with the ancient status of the blue and yellow colors is also part of the "outburst of interest in wide layers of the population in our natural cultural history, in our historical roots and historical traditions," to quote L. Melnyk, a professor at Kiev University.³² In the words of a young Kiev student, part of the process of the "healing of the national soul which was ripped apart by decades of terror and falsehood is an attempt to reconstruct the authentic historical experience of the people. People cannot live with a false memory. They want to know their past, since it is easier for a people to have a future, if they have a past."³³

In Ukraine today a massive effort is underway to "reconstruct" the past: witness, for example, the popularity of the magazine *Pamiatky Ukrainy* (Memorials of Ukraine), whose circulation increased by 50,000 between its third and fourth issues in 1989; or the work of the Archeographical Commission of the Academy of Sciences which recently announced that it would publish, in the next decade, over 300 books considered as essential sources for the historical memory of Ukrainians. The assertion that the

flag should be used because its colors are part of the memory of the Ukrainian people found much resonance. For example, a construction worker from industrial Kirovohrad (with the Russian name Avdiiev) supported the flag "because it is a sacred historical relic." Another resident of Kirovohrad noted, "Now I do not reject the flag because I read so much authoritative information that these were the colors of our ancestors."³⁴ Or to quote A. Tetarenko from Kiev, "A one thousand-year old history of symbolism is a weighty argument in itself."³⁵

But of course, this was not the only argument advanced in support of the flag's usage. At the same time as presenting evidence to show that the blue and yellow colors were "historic," came bitter attacks on the existing symbols of the Soviet Ukrainian state. Official propaganda itself had invited this response when it tried to discredit the blue and yellow symbol because "under these colors were committed all kinds of horrors."³⁶ To compare the "horrors" committed under the blue and yellow colors with those perpetrated under the red banner was of course not much of a contest. As V. Stepaniv wrote,

Under which flag was the Communist Party of Western Ukraine demolished, and its best forces incarcerated in Stalinist camps?... Under whose flags were tens of millions of innocent people tortured in the NKVD prisons, murdered in Siberia, died terrible deaths during the man-made famine of 1932-33... Here is where the agony and blood is to be found... This is an ocean of blood. By comparison only a miserable drop of blood was spilt by the blue and yellow flag.³⁷

The red color, as ethnographers now asserted, was the color Ukrainians used to express mourning in ancient times.³⁸ The adoption of the red flag by the Soviet state was almost prophetic.

Public opinion polls conducted throughout Ukraine in the summer of 1989 showed considerable dissatisfaction with official symbols. In evaluating the results of these polls, it should be noted that the results probably underrepresent the extent of discontent because of the manner in which some of the polling took place. For example, 385 workers in the Lviv Kineskop factory wrote a letter protesting the "provocative phrasing" of questions, and the fact that the respondents to the questionnaire had been selected by factory management, rather than at random.³⁹ We were able to see the results of the public opinion poll for the city of Kiev and

for the town of Koziatyn (Vinnytsia oblast in central Ukraine). The data showed that existing Soviet Ukrainian national symbolism was considered "artificial" by 43 per cent of Ukrainians, 45 per cent of Russians, and 50 per cent of Jewish respondents; 29 per cent of Ukrainians, 30 per cent of Russians, and 28 per cent of Jews were satisfied with the existing symbols—and the remainder offered no response.⁴⁰

In the autumn of 1989 we overheard many conversations at public meetings, demonstrations, and in private homes, in which the feeling was expressed that the red flag was discredited by Stalinism and by being the banner of the "partocracy" (party bureaucracy). This negative argument was expressed most commonly, it appeared to us, by the least nationally conscious sectors of the population. As a group of Kiev residents put it: "We will accept anything but the red flag."⁴¹ In the words of a writer in the information bulletin of the Club of Kiev Deputies to the USSR Council of People's Deputies, "Let us be materialists. . . the red and blue flag is a symbol of the system. . . of secret stores, special resorts, special cars, privileged housing. . . privileged food supply."⁴²

The high degree of alienation from the symbols of the Soviet Ukrainian state created a vacuum which could potentially be filled by the blue and yellow flag. But the negative push of the "symbols of the nomenklatura"⁴³ was not the same as the positive pull of the blue and yellow colors. The above-cited public opinion poll found that making the blue and yellow the official flag of Ukraine was supported by 35 per cent of Ukrainians, 25 per cent of Russians, and 22 per cent of Jews. (Figures for those opposed to this measure, as compared with those giving no reply, were not provided.) Of course, it should be noted that the demand that the blue and yellow flag become the state flag was confined largely to Western Ukraine. In other regions the national movement was asking merely for the democratic right to use the colors without reprisals from the police. In any case, whether or not the use of the flag would be supported by public opinion would be decided by the ability of the national opposition to popularize it, and to fill this symbol with a content meaningful to the mass of the population of the republic.

Throughout the summer and autumn of 1989, numerous informal associations campaigned to increase the flag's visibility, especially in Eastern Ukraine. These efforts were greatly assisted by the establishment of "liberated zones" in all of the major centers of Ukraine. These are popularly called Hyde Parks, and they are fixed locations where at fixed times

people gather to discuss, to exchange information, and to sell unofficial literature and blue and yellow pins. The militia leaves these Hyde Parks in peace. For example, in Kharkiv, the Hyde Park is located at the Metro exit on Dzerzhynsky Square and opens every day at 5 p.m. At this “beloved location of Kharkiv democrats” fly blue and yellow flags, and it even sports “an enormous poster calling on people to donate money to pay the fines of those caught carrying the blue and yellow flag during demonstrations.”⁴⁴

The unofficial press, which by late summer of 1989 numbered over 200 bulletins and newsletters, carried on a vibrant agitation in favor of the flag. Poems and songs were written in its honor. Activists in Eastern Ukraine began to research the local history as it related to the flag’s appearance in order to show that it also had roots in their locale. Thus, for example, an unofficial bulletin published in the southern port city of Kherson found that after the downfall of tsarism, part of the Black Sea fleet “in March 1917 raised Ukrainian flags.”⁴⁵

By this time the flag had established itself in Galicia, and authorities there had largely ceased trying to stop its use. However, in other regions of the republic, especially in the smaller towns, repression was still the order of the day. In Vinnytsia, for example, in September 1989, activists were fined 250 rubles for flying the blue and yellow colors at a meeting.⁴⁶ However, the campaign to have the right to fly the flag showed no signs of abating, and it was taken up with considerable enthusiasm by youth.

For many young people, especially for those with a weakly developed national consciousness, the blue and yellow flag had become a metaphor for a general revulsion against the established order. The fact that special detachments of the militia showered blows on the heads of those carrying it, helped establish the flag’s credentials. As early as the spring of 1989, the flag was already a popular item with Kiev’s youth underground: its punkers, rockers, and “heavy metallists” who were undoubtedly unaware of its ancient origins, but very much taken by its contemporary role as an irritant to the establishment. Many young people started to wear blue and yellow headbands, paint blue and yellow stripes on their foreheads, and sport blue and yellow pins on their jackets.⁴⁷ The apogee of the flag’s role in the youth culture was the ‘Chervona ruta’ rock festival held in Chernivtsi, on September 19–25, 1989, Ukraine’s first such rock festival.

All roads to Chernivtsi were covered by the militia which stopped all incoming cars, searching for national symbols, and turned away all people

whom they considered suspicious. At the railway station and throughout the city itself, groups of the KGB "hunted for people with blue and yellow flags." But such searches had little success. Young people showed incredible ingenuity in smuggling the colors into the stadium. Word soon spread throughout Ukraine of the thousands of defiant teenagers in jeans and T-shirts who filled the stadium in scenes reminiscent of Woodstock and waved the flag in time to the pounding beat of rock music. The flag found a place in underground youth culture, not only among students but elementary and high school pupils as well.⁴⁸

The rise of Rukh was the most important development in the story of the blue and yellow flag. Formed at the initiative of informal groups in Western Ukraine, Rukh became a dominant force in Kiev by the summer of 1989, and quickly spread to most regions of Ukraine. By the time of its founding congress in September 1989 it had almost 300,000 members and was growing daily. In its ranks were many workers. Because of the importance of Western Ukrainians in Rukh, the blue and yellow banner became the unofficial symbol of Rukh as well, and became closely identified in the minds of the population at large with the Rukh program. This is not the place to outline in detail the platform of Rukh. Suffice it to say that in addition to upholding the sovereignty of the republic, and the promotion of Ukrainian language and culture, Rukh incorporated democratic discourse in the widest sense of the term: discourse on social justice, ecology, the abolition of privilege, and the democratization of the political, social, and economic order. Rukh also staked its ground on the solidarity of nations, and at its founding congress it appealed to Russians in Ukraine for support. Its platform incorporated the struggle against anti-Semitism.⁴⁹ Rukh became a social, political, and national movement, but not a nationalist one. This accounts for the fact why over one-third of Rukh activists in Kiev enterprises are of Jewish origin.⁵⁰

It was with the politics of Rukh that the blue and yellow flag became identified. The flag's most visible manifestation was at the countless meetings organized throughout Ukraine in the summer and autumn of 1989. These meetings, it should be noted, were mostly not about purely national concerns. Rather, they were held to protest the undemocratic electoral laws which were proposed by the Ukrainian party apparatus. The campaign in favor of democracy was, in most regions, dominated by the blue and yellow banner. Rukh activists used the flag as a visible symbol to assist them in galvanizing the support of the population. In the course of

this activity, the flag developed new meaning, which went far beyond its historic national symbolism. For example, in the town of Teresva (Transcarpathian oblast) at a lumber mill a young man called on his fellow workers to follow the miners' lead and stand up for their rights. He raised the blue and yellow flag "as a sign of the unity and decisiveness of workers."⁵¹ Defending the blue and yellow colors, six Jewish activists wrote the following: "In meetings . . . beginning from the spring of last year there appeared scores of blue and yellow flags and the vast majority of Ukrainians welcome this as proof of genuine perestroika."⁵²

This point was made by several writers in the unofficial press. Iu. Almazov from the Kuban suggested the campaign against the blue and yellow flag had nothing at all to do with the particular significance of the colors: "If the famous crimson banner [of the Cossacks] were reborn today, then there would be a similar storm surrounding it." It was simply a matter of officialdom battling against the flag as a symbol of opposition.⁵³ Another suggested, "The essence of the problem lies not in colors, but in the very fact of the appearance of an unofficial flag, under which those sympathetic to radical reform in the republic gather. Such a reform poses a threat to all of those for whom life in Ukraine is comfortable."⁵⁴

Ironically, the biggest obstacle to the use of the blue and yellow colors as the symbol of the new opposition, of Rukh, came not from the party bureaucracy, but from Donbass miners. In planning the congress of Rukh, held in Kiev September 8–10, 1989, the Rukh leadership had an agonizing debate on whether or not to decorate the congress hall with blue and yellow flags. At issue was whether the symbol would be accepted by the delegates coming from Ukraine's southern industrial region, the Donbass. Since Rukh was strongest in Kiev and in Western Ukraine, the voices in favor of a prominent display of the symbol won. When congress delegates entered the hall, most were awestruck by the sea of blue and yellow colors which decorated the concert hall of the Kiev Polytechnical Institute. The question of the flag's adoption as Rukh's symbol was placed on the agenda. The Donbass delegation declared that it would quit Rukh if the blue and yellow flag was adopted as the symbol of the organization. On the other hand, the Western Ukrainian group said that they would take similar action if the Congress failed to adopt this measure.

And why were the Donbass miners opposed to the flag? During the "hot summer" of 1989 a massive strike wave engulfed the Donbass coal fields and workers established their own movement and organizational

structures—the strike committees—which were independent of Rukh. For Rukh, winning the support of the strike committee movement was obviously of great political importance. But Donbass is the most Russified region of Ukraine: 45 per cent of the population there is ethnically Russian, and 90 per cent of the Ukrainian population is Russian-speaking.⁵⁵ Unofficial groups such as the Ukrainian Helsinki Union and others which played such an important role in popularizing the use of the flag elsewhere in Ukraine, had few members in Donbass. Thus, the blue and yellow flag was largely unknown there. Moreover, for many activists in the strike committees the flag was a symbol of Rukh, that is, of another organization. The strike committees wanted to maintain their independence. Adopting the flag would indicate that they were coming “under the control of the Rukh leadership in Kiev and Lviv,” an image which they did not want to project, especially since Rukh was rather weak in Donbass. Another factor was that the flag symbolized a political opposition, and within strike committees there were many differences as to whether or not the committees should limit themselves to trade union demands, or whether they should become involved in politics.⁵⁶ But above all, the national movement was weak in Donbass. “There is a dire lack of people who know Ukrainian culture and history. . . . Miners. . . do not know the real history of the blue and yellow symbol, while official propaganda has done everything to present them in a negative light,” wrote two Rukh activists from Donbass.⁵⁷ The miners’ delegation at the Rukh congress explained that it was important for them not to alienate the Russian population of Donbass by adopting symbols which were foreign to their experience, and which, in the minds of some, were associated with “Ukrainian nationalism.”⁵⁸ As a miner from the Donbass declared at the Rukh Congress, the system had robbed the miners of much, including their cultural identity. They are only now beginning to become aware of Ukrainian culture, and pleaded with the Congress delegates to help them in this process, and not to force a symbol before a consciousness which would be receptive to it had a chance to develop.⁵⁹

In the end, a compromise was reached. The resolution adopted by Rukh on “national symbols” stated that

they were the code of the historical memory of a people. . . . The blue and yellow combination is one of the most ancient of contemporary flag colors, and its origin lies with the first Kievan princes. . . . During the

civil war and in the first years of Soviet power, both national and revolutionary symbolism were frequently used together by various groups, especially by Soviet ones.

The resolution called for a popular educational campaign to explain the content of the symbol, and to support the revival of the national symbols of other ethnic groups living on the territory of Ukraine. It also demanded that the government of the Ukrainian SSR cease persecuting those using the symbols in public.⁶⁰ In short, the Rukh congress declared the blue and yellow flag as the national symbol, but did not make its use mandatory for the organization.

Analyzing the outcome of the Congress discussion on the use of the flag, members of Rukh from the city of Donetsk, the largest center of the Donbass, noted that in that region "Rukh will temporarily remove the question of national symbols . . . from its agitation." They wrote, "If Rukh is to become a real force in Donbass, then it has to deal with the people such as they are. Rukh has to focus on that which unites people, and that is the campaign for democratic elections, democratization, and the economic independence of Ukraine."⁶¹ By the early autumn of 1989, however, within the context of that campaign, the blue and yellow flag began to surface in the Donbass. It surfaced in Donetsk at a memorial meeting in honor of miners who died in industrial accidents, and at a meeting in support of a democratic electoral law.⁶² At the memorial meeting members of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union, who showed up with flags, addressed the crowd and articulated demands for independent trade unions and political democratization. The presence of the flag provided a "very heated discussion around the national question." The Helsinki Union members left the meeting invigorated. They reported, "Donetsk is awakening."⁶³

That there is an awakening in Ukraine is not in doubt. Reports from the southern industrial regions of Ukraine indicate the blue and yellow flags' increased use at public meetings.⁶⁴ The flag, as we have argued, has become a metaphor with many meanings. It is unparalleled as the symbol of national revival. For a people whose places of memory were ravaged by an unkind history, the flag was virtually all that they had. As a Kiev writer put it, "Irrespective of the absence of statehood, throughout more than 300 years we fortunately preserved historical symbolism, the blue and yellow flag."⁶⁵ In a poem eulogizing the flag a young woman wrote:

Apart from it and our songs
 we have nothing. Nothing
 except for grave mounds
 marking the Siberian landscape.⁶⁶

Irrespective of claims of the ancient status of the blue and yellow colors, for most residents the flag is a new symbol, whose meaning is only now being established. Most Ukrainians see the symbol at public meetings and demonstrations, and have come to identify it with a new political force—Rukh. We had occasion to witness a public meeting in Kiev in October 1989 called by Rukh and attended by some 40,000 people. The slogan of the meeting was: “For a Law on Elections, For a Law on Language—the Precondition of Perestroika.” Kiev residents said this was the largest manifestation of the blue and yellow colors to date. A sea of blue and yellow flags adorned the stage. Let us end this paper by giving an account of what transpired, for it is in meetings such as this that the meaning of the symbol is constituted.⁶⁷

The flags were carried mainly by youth. Some of them, in decidedly punkish dress, adorned their clothes with these colors. There was a brisk trade in blue and yellow pins. Socially, the crowd was clearly plebeian. Let us summarize the speeches:

S. Konev, a Russian from the Dnipropetrovsk region, who is deputy head of Rukh and one of Ukraine’s most popular opposition figures, condemned “chauvinism and nationalism” and warned that the “apparatus is attempting to sow discord among the people with its pseudo-internationalism.” He attacked the privileges of the elite: “We have a social pyramid where the people have only one right—the right to produce, and those on top monopolize the right to appropriate and divide that which we produce.” He called on “Russians, Ukrainians, Jews, to unite for the common goal of social justice, and economic and political sovereignty so that the people can be masters in their own home, so that we have a lawful society with economic and social development for all.”

V. Linchevsky, from the Rukh secretariat and a leading activist of an informal organization most closely identified with national demands, said:

In the fifth year of perestroika and at the end of the twentieth century the people of Ukraine have no laws and no democracy. . . . What kind

of democracy is this when 50 million people watch the nomenklatura caste commit crimes and have no legal possibilities to oppose this? . . . What kind of law when it is written by one sector of society and becomes compulsory for the rest.

O. Lavrynovych from the Rukh council said,

Our times are called revolutionary and the main question of every revolution is the question of power. We had a revolution in 1917 under the slogan "All Power to the Soviets"—but today we are also raising this slogan—this means that the 1917 revolution was defeated and that after 1917 a counter-revolutionary coup took place. And in whose hands did power end up? And who ruled this country for more than half a century? The name of this political force is the party nomenklatura caste. . . . The new electoral law proposed by Rukh is there to reclaim power. . . . The awakened masses of Ukraine are the only force which will guarantee a democratic Ukrainian state. Glory to Ukraine!

S. Khmara, a member of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union and of the Lviv Strike Committee said, "The strike committees are the only force which can ensure change and I appeal to all strike committees of Ukraine to uphold high civic values and if a just electoral law is not passed, then all strike committees have to use decisive forms of struggle—the strike." He called on the formation of an "All Ukrainian Coordinating Center of Strike Committees" and condemned the Communist Party of Ukraine as "a reactionary force which blames workers for all the economic mess which is their doing."

S. Holovaty, also from Rukh, bitterly attacked the propaganda campaign of the official press which aims to discredit Rukh as "extremist and nationalist" and condemned the "monstrous campaign against national symbols."

D. Pavlychko, newly elected to the Congress of People's Deputies, head of the Shevchenko Ukrainian Language Society, and a major figure in Rukh said,

My electors voted not for me personally, but for the state status of the Ukrainian language, for the democratization of our society, for the demolition of the imperial Soviet Union and the creation in its place of a

union of free republics. My electorate met me with blue and yellow flags. . . . In these flags is our national history and consciousness. . . . In these flags are embodied our hopes for the equality of Ukrainians, Jews, Russians. . . all people of Ukraine, all people of the Soviet Union.

(His speech was greeted with a huge applause and shouts of 'Hurrah.')

With a minute's silence, the meeting honored the memory of a leader of the Donbass Strike Committee—Sotnikov—who was known to be favorable to Rukh, and who had been killed under mysterious circumstances.

An ovation greeted the introduction of P. Sviditsky representing Donbass. He said, "They lie to you when they say that we went on strike to take kovbasa from all of Ukraine. . . . You can't shut us up by kovbasa and we will not sell our mothers for it. We want democracy. The strike wave was also in support of political change. The apparatus is trying to drive a wedge between Eastern and Western Ukrainians." From the crowd were heard shouts of "Unity."

A small group of workers present at the meeting approached a young person holding the blue and yellow flag, and in a Ukrainian-Russian creole asked, "What is this banner." The young person replied, "These are our ancient colors. Why they were used in Kievan Rus'. You know, you've heard from the speakers what these colors stand for. You can make up your own minds."

And today, millions of people in Ukraine are doing just that.

NOTES

1. Pierre Nora, "Présentation," in *Les lieux de mémoire*, vol. I, *La république* (Paris 1984), vii.
2. In Eastern Ukraine, which was for centuries part of the Russian Empire before the revolution, what the tsarist regime did not succeed in destroying, Stalinism did. For example, most churches built by Hetman Ivan Mazepa, who rebelled against Peter I at the turn of the eighteenth century, were destroyed in the 1930s to eradicate the visible symbols of this "traitor to the Fatherland." In Western Ukraine, annexed by the USSR after the Second World War, the most important cemeteries, where soldiers were buried who fought on the side of the Western Ukrainian People's Republic in 1918 against Polish forces, were bulldozed by Soviet authorities, and the "bones ground up, and in their plundered graves others were buried." As Western Ukrainians point out today,

- "Even these soldiers' direct enemies—the Poles—did not conceive of carrying out such a sacrilege." See **Viche*, no. 2, July 1989 (* indicates "unofficial" bulletin or newspaper).
3. *Dumka*, no. 4, November 1989.
 4. Interview no. 4, with O. M., November 1989. (Transcripts of this and other interviews are deposited in the Archive on Contemporary Ukraine, Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, University of Alberta.)
 5. *Vilna Ukraina*, no. 1, April 1989.
 6. Taras Kuzio, "Unofficial Groups and Publications in Ukraine," *Report on the USSR*, no. 47, November 1989.
 7. **Bukovynskyi visnyk*, no. 1, August 1989.
 8. **Informator*, no. 1, April 1989.
 9. *Ibid.*, no. 3, May 1989.
 10. **Bukovynskyi visnyk*, no. 1, August 1989.
 11. *Vechirnyi Kiev*, May 27, 1989.
 12. Interview no. 1, with M. S. and B. H., November 1989.
 13. *Prapor komunizmu*, May 26, 1989.
 14. Interview no. 1.
 15. *Radianska Ukraina*, February 26, 1989.
 16. *Lvovskaia pravda*, June 17, 1989.
 17. *Radianska Ukraina*, February 26, 1989.
 18. *Vechirnyi Kiev*, May 27, 1989.
 19. **Viche*, no. 1, June 1989.
 20. **Vil'ne slovo*, no. 2, July 1989.
 21. *Ukrainian News*, July 1989.
 22. *Literaturna Ukraina*, July 6, 1989.
 23. *Ibid.*, July 13, 1989.
 24. **Holos*, no. 2, August 20, 1989.
 25. **Viche*, no. 4, August 1989.
 26. *Ibid.*
 27. **Vybir*, no. 8, September 5, 1989.
 28. Serhii Bilokin, "Pohlianno vhlub istorii," *Literaturna Ukraina*, July 6, 1989; Bohdan Iakymovych, "Do pytannia pro ukrainsku natsionalnu symvoliku," *Pamiatky Ukrainy*, no. 3, 1989; Andrii Hrechko, "Do pytannia pro natsionalnyi prapor," *Pamiatky Ukrainy*, no. 4, 1989.
 29. Iakymovych, "Do pytannia pro ukrainsku natsionalnu symvoliku."
 30. Hrechko, "Do pytannia pro natsionalnyi prapor."
 31. **Viche*, no. 2, July 1989; **Postup*, no. 14, November 1989.
 32. *Kyivskyi universytet*, June 22, 1989.
 33. Interview no. 2, with Ia. B., November 1989.
 34. *Dumka*, no. 4, November 1989.
 35. **Holos*, no. 3, 3 September 1989.
 36. *Literaturna Ukraina*, July 6, 1989.
 37. **Viche*, no. 2, July 1989.

38. *Bukovyns'kyi visnyk, no. 1, August 1989.
39. *Viche, no. 3, July 1989.
40. I. E. Bekeshkina, "Shcho dumaiut kyiany pro natsionalnu symboliku" (typescript).
41. Interview no. 1.
42. *Holos, no. 3, September 3, 1989.
43. Ibid.
44. *Postup, no. 16, November 1989.
45. *Pluh, no. 1, 1989.
46. *Lvivski novyny, no. 6-7, 1989.
47. Interview no. 1; interview no. 3, with P. O., October 1989.
48. *Lvivski novyny, no. 6-7, 1989; interview no. 1; *Vybir, no. 9, October 9, 1989.
49. Rukh congress materials are reproduced in a special issue of *Suchasnist*, no. 12, December 1989.
50. Interview no. 5, with Zh. I., October 1989.
51. *Lvivski novyny, no. 6-7, 1989.
52. *Khadashot, no. 2, October 1989.
53. *Viche, no. 12, December 1989.
54. *Holos, no. 3, September 1989.
55. *Vybir, no. 9, October 9, 1989.
56. Interview no. 6, with O. M., October 1989.
57. *Vybir, no. 9, October 9, 1989.
58. J. V. Koshiw, "First Congress of the Popular Movement for the Reconstruction of the Ukraine (RUKH)," *Across Frontiers*, no. 4, 1989.
59. Tape of the First Congress of Rukh, deposited at the Ukrainian Language Education Centre, Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, University of Alberta.
60. "Pro natsionalnu symboliku," *Suchasnist*, no. 12, December 1989.
61. *Vybir, no. 9, October 9, 1989.
62. *Holos vidrozhennia, no. 6, September 1989; *Lvivski novyny, no. 6-7, 1989.
63. *Lvivski novyny, no. 6-7, 1989.
64. See, for example, *Zhorna, no. 2, November 1989, for an account of public meetings in Dnipropetrovsk, or *Chornomoria, no. 1, December 1989, for reports from Mykolaiv.
65. *Holos, no. 3, September 3, 1989.
66. *Viche, no. 3, 1989.
67. Tape of the Kiev meeting, deposited at the Ukrainian Language Education Centre, Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, University of Alberta.

Prague as a Resource for the Study of Ukrainian Literature¹

In the years separating the two world wars, Prague was the largest and most dynamic center of Ukrainian émigré life. The presence of a large body of intellectuals and activists who had arrived after the fall of the Ukrainian People's Republic (UNR) and the sympathetic treatment accorded them by the young Czechoslovakian democracy led to the formation of a number of organizations and institutions: a university (Ukrainskyi vilnyi universytet), a technical institute (Ukrainska hospodarska akademiia, later this became the Ukrainskyi tekhnichno-hospodarskyi instytut), a pedagogical institute (Ukrainskyi vysokyi pedahohichnyi instytut M. Drahomanova), an art institute (Ukrainska studiia plastychnoho mystetstva), and a secondary school (Ukrainska realna gimnaziia). Support groups sprang up for refugees, such as the Civic Committee (Ukrainskyi hromadskyi komitet); professional organizations were formed for doctors, lawyers, teachers, engineers, students, and academics; and a network of sporting, youth, and cultural organizations appeared (among them the important Muzei vyzvolnoi borotby Ukrainy).²

Among the prominent writers who lived and published in the city were: Oleksander Oles, Ievhen Malaniuk, Iurii Darahan, Oleksa Stefanovych, Natalena Koroleva, Oksana Liaturynska, Myroslav Irchan, Oleh Olzhych, Olena Teliha, and Ulas Samchuk. The artists Mykola Butovych, Vasyl Kasiian, Ivan Kulets, Robert Lisovsky, Halyna Mazepa, and Volodymyr Sichynsky either taught or studied there; and a number of prominent scholars and bibliographers—Dmytro Doroshenko, Oleksander Kolessa,

Stepan Siropolko, Stepan Smal-Stotsky, Dmytro Chyzhevsky, Dmytro Antonovych, and Sofia Rusova, to name only a few—produced important work in Prague.

The establishment of an institutional infrastructure was accompanied by a massive effort to collect archival materials in the expectation that Prague would for many years become a powerful outpost of Ukrainian life. Most of this activity came to a halt with the arrival of Soviet troops in 1945 and many materials were subsequently confiscated and shipped to the USSR. Recent attempts by Prague Ukrainians to locate these have thus far not been successful. However, notwithstanding the widespread belief that most valuable materials were removed, much can still be located in libraries, archives, and private collections.³

It is generally well known that Prague is rich in pre-twentieth-century Ukrainian literature. The location of Ivan Fedorov's *Apostol* (Lviv 1574), *Biblia* (Ostroh 1581), works by Meletii Smotrytsky, Pamva Berynda, Lazar Baranovych, Feofan Prokopovych and other sixteenth-, seventeenth-, and eighteenth-century texts has been listed in Orest Zilynsky's valuable bibliography published in 1968. This volume also surveys the available nineteenth-century Ukrainian texts and is of particular interest to students of politics and folklore, since it lists the substantial literature on Ukraine in Czech publications.⁴ The strength of twentieth-century materials, particularly dealing with the increasingly topical interwar "nationalist" emigration is, however, less widely known.

1. LIBRARY SOURCES.

The single best resource for Ukrainian studies is the Slavic Library in the Klementinum building (Slovanska knihovna, Praha 1, Klementinum). During the interwar years this former Jesuit monastery served as the library for the ministry of external affairs. Diplomats were instructed to acquire and ship home valuable materials. This activity, coupled with the efforts of local Ukrainians, has resulted in an unrivalled collection of first editions and periodicals from the twenties and thirties of our century. The library also houses a large collection of imperial Russian, German, and Soviet maps; a splendid collection of works dealing with Ukrainian folklore, philology, and criticism; and an impressive array of journals. The Ukrainian holdings are estimated by local librarians at 45–50,000 volumes, thus constituting one of the largest Ukrainian collections outside the USSR.⁵

Besides substantial listings under the names of pre-1917 classics such as

Shevchenko, Nechui-Levytsky, and Franko, it contains practically unobtainable first editions of early post-revolutionary Soviet writers such as Volodymyr Koriak, Valerian Polishchuk (for example, his *Hryhorii Skovoroda. Biohrafichno-lirychnyi roman* [Kharkiv 1929]), Mykhail Semenko (his *Derzannia* [Kiev 1914]), Geo Shkurupii and Pavlo Tychyna (his *Skovoroda. Uryvky z symfonii* [Lviv 1923] and *Chernihiv* [Kharkiv 1931]). Also well represented are the works of literary critics active in the twenties and thirties, such as: Iaroslav Hordynsky, Dmytro Chyzhevsky, Leonid Biletsky, Ivan Ohiienko, Mykyta Shapoval (Sribliansky), Serhii Iefremov, and Mykhailo Hrushevsky. The number of Czech critics who published on Ukrainian themes in the post-1917 period includes Antonín Hartl, Jíří Horák, Frank Wollman, Ivan Olbracht, František Tichý, Mikuláš Nevrlý, Jaroslav Vávra, Michal Molnár, and Václav Židlický.

The study of Carpatho-Ukrainian dialects and identity constituted an important area of specialization for local Slavists. This has resulted in a strong philological section containing numerous anthologies, grammars, catechisms, the polemical literature from the turn of the century to the forties, and studies by Volodymyr Birchak, Avhustyn Voloshyn, Antonin Hartl, Ivan Olbracht, František Tichý, Orest Zilynsky, Ivan Pankevych, Oleksander Kolessa, and others.⁶

The pride of this library is a collection of well over 1,000 periodicals, a great many of which are simply unobtainable elsewhere. Given the wealth of this collection, only a sampling can be provided. The following is a partial selection of those available in complete or near complete runs. The subtitle and editor of less well-known titles is included for purposes of identification.⁷

Bibliolohichni visty. Kiev, 1923–30

Chervonyi shliakh. Kharkiv, 1923–36.

Doroha. Shchomisiachnyi iliustrovanyi zhurnal. Ed. V. M. Hoshovsky. Krakow, 1940–4.

Dzvony. Literaturno-naukovy misiachnyk. Ed. P. Isaiv. Lviv, 1931–8.

Etnohrafichnyi zbirnyk. Ed. M. Hrushevsky. Lviv, 1895–1929.

Etnohrafichnyi visnyk. Ed. A. Lobody and V. Petrov. Kiev, 1925–30.

Hart. Kharkiv, 1927–32.

Holos. Chasopys dlia ukrainsiv u Nimechchyni. Ed. B. Kravtsiv. Berlin, 1942–5.

Hromada. Ed. M. Drahomanov. Geneva, 1878–81.

Khliborobska Ukraina. Vienna, 1920–33.

- Kievskaia mysl. Kiev, 1908–14.
- Kino. Zhurnal ukrainskoi kinematohrafii. Ed. V. Lifshyts. Kharkiv, 1924–30.
- Knyholiub. Ed. S. Siropolko. Prague, 1927–32.
- Krakivski visti. Ed. M. Khomiak. Krakow, 1940–5.
- Literaturna hazeta. Kiev, 1929–39, 1952–62. (From 1962 became *Literaturna Ukraina*.)
- Literaturno-naukovyi visnyk. Lviv, 1898–1914, 1922–32.
- Literaturnyi iarmarok. Kharkiv, 1928–9.
- Literaturnyi zhurnal. Kiev-Kharkiv, 1936–8.
- Litopys revoliutsii. Kharkiv, 1922–32.
- Litopys ukrainskoho druku. 1924–40.
- Listroi. Ed. Ia. Gorodskoi. Kharkiv, 1933–7.
- Lvivski visti. Shchodennyk dlia distryktu Halychyny. Ed. Osyp Bodnarovych. Lviv, 1942–3.
- Molodniak. Kharkiv, 1927–37.
- Movoznavstvo. Kiev, 1934–40.
- Mystetstvo. Kiev, 1956–69.
- Natsiia v pokhodi. Berlin, 1939–41.
- Naperedodni literaturno-mystetskyi i naukovyi chasopys. Ed. B. Kravtsiv. Lviv, 1937.
- Narod. Ed. M. Pavlyk and I. Franko. Lviv, 1890–5.
- Nastup. Ed. I. Sych. Khust, 1939–43.
- Nasha pravda. Lviv, 1923–33.
- Naukovi zapysky instytutu movoznavstva im. O. O. Potebni AN URSR. Ed. L. A. Bulakhovsky. Kiev, 1941–63.
- Naukovyi zbirnyk kharkivskoi naukovo-doslidchoi katedry istorii Ukrainy. Kharkiv, 1924–30.
- Naukovyi zbirnyk Muzeiu ukrainskoi kultury v Svydnyku. Ed. I. Chabuniak. Bratislava, 1965–83.
- Nazustrich. Lviv, 1934–7.
- Nova doba. Iliustrovanyi tyzhnevnyk. Berlin, 1941–4.
- Nova Ukraina. Prague, 1922–8.
- Nove mystetstvo. Kharkiv, 1926–8.
- Nove ukrainske slovo. Ed. K. F. Stepa. Kiev, 1942.
- Novi shliakhy. Ed. A. Krushelnytsky. Lviv, 1929–32.
- Obrazotvorche mystetstvo. Ed. M. Darahan et al. Kharkiv, 1934–9.
- Pratsi ukrainskoho istorychno-filolohichnoho tovarystva v Prazi. Prague, 1926–44.
- Put k prosveshcheniu. Organ glavpolitprosveta. Kharkiv, 1922–3.

- Put prosveshcheniia. Pedagogicheskii zhurnal. Teoriia prosveshcheniia metodologiia, prosvetitelnaia praktika, byt. Kharkiv, 1922–40.
- Pysmo z prosvity. Organ tov. "Prosvity" u Lvovi. Ed. Ia. Veselovsky. Lviv, 1908–27.
- Radianska muzyka. Kharkiv, 1936–41.
- Rozbudova natsii. Prague, 1928–34.
- Sbornik istoriko-filologicheskogo obshchestva pri institute kniazia Bezborodko v Nezhine. Kiev, 1896–1919.
- Sobranie uzakonenii i rasporiadzhonii raboche-krestianskogo pravitelstva Ukrainy. Kharkiv, 1920.
- Sotsiialistychna dumka. Tsentralnyi organ Ukrainskoi sots-dem partii. Ed. M. Hankevych. Lviv, 1921–3.
- Student revoliutsii. Kharkiv, 1923–32.
- Studentskyi visnyk. Prague, 1923–8, 1930–1.
- Studii z istorii Ukrainskoi naukovo-doslidchoi katedry istorii Ukrainy v Kyievi. Ed. M. Hrushevsky. Kiev, 1926, 1929, 1930.
- Studii z polia suspilnykh nauk i statystyky. Ed. M. Hrushevsky. Lviv, 1909–12, 1927–30.
- Svit. Literaturno-naukovy chasopys. Ed. V. Birchak. Lviv, 1906–7.
- Tabor. Voienno-naukovy zhurnal. Orhan molodoi ukrainskoi armii. Kalisz, 1923–39.
- Teatr. Kiev, 1936–40.
- Tryzub. Paris, 1925–39.
- Ukraina. Ed. M. Hrushevsky et al. Kiev, 1914–32.
- Ukrainska diisnist. Ed. I. Kalynovych. Prague, 1940–5.
- Ukrainska knyha. Ed. Ie. Pelensky. Lviv, 1937–43.
- Ukrainskaia zhizn. Moscow, 1912–14.
- Ukrainske slovo. Zhytomyr, 1941.
- Ukrainskyi visnyk. Berlin, 1942–5.
- Visnyk soiuzu vyzvolennia Ukrainy. Vienna, 1914–7.
- Visty Muzeiu vyzvolnoi borotby Ukrainy. Prague, 1925–38.
- Vpered. Orhan sots-dem partii pidkarpatskoi Rusy. Ed. D. Nimchuk. Uzhhorod, 1929–36, 1938.
- Zapysky ist-fil viddilu UAN. Kiev, 1919–31.
- Zapysky Ukrainskoho naukovoho instytutu v Berlini. Berlin-Leipzig, 1927–31.
- Zapysky Ukrainskoho naukovoho tovarystva v Kyievi. Kiev, 1908–30.
- Zapysky Ukrainskoi akademichnoi hromady pry Ukrainskii hospodarskii akademii v Ch.SR. Podjebrady, 1923–5.

Zbirnyk filolohichnoi sektiï NTSh. Lviv, 1898–1937.
 Znannia. Ed. Mykola Khrystovy. Kharkiv, 1924–32.
 Zhyttie i slovo. Ed. I. Franko. Lviv, 1984–7.
 Zhyttia i revoliutsiia. Kiev, 1925–30, 1932–4.

Of special interest are the periodicals dealing with Transcarpathian and Subcarpathian life, which are a rich source for the linguistic debates of the interwar years. They include such titles as:

Blahoviastnik. Dukhovna gazeta dlia podkarpatskikh ruzinov. Uzhhorod, 1923–4.
 Carpatica. Prague, 1936–40.
 Tserkovnaia pravda. Khust, 1925–6.
 Karpatska pravda. Uzhhorod, 1927–45.
 Karpatskii krai. Mukachevo, 1923–5.
 Karpatskyi sviat. Uzhhorod, 1928–33.
 Litopys boikivshchyny. Sambir, 1931–9.
 Naukovyi zbornik tov. Prosvita v Uzhhorodi. Uzhhorod, 1922–38.
 Pcholka. Uzhhorod, 1924–32.
 Proboiem. Chasopys pidkarpatskoi molodi. Prague, 1934–42.
 Russkaia zemlia. Uzhhorod, 1925–38.
 Svoboda. Uzhhorod, 1923–38.

A further rich source of information on local history can be found in the calendars, bulletins of church organizations, and reports of various local institutions, academic and student bodies.

It should, finally, be noted that the extent and richness of this library's Ukrainian holdings are still to be fully appreciated. Neither the general reader's catalogue, nor the restricted access catalogue are complete. Many cards were removed by library workers in 1945 and have never been returned. A full inventory of holdings has not been conducted since that date.

Besides the Slovanská knihovna, three other libraries have substantial Ukrainian holdings. The Library of the National Museum (Knihovna Národního musea. Praha 2. Václavské náměstí 68) has a rich collection of seventeenth to nineteenth-century classics and is a good source for Czech-Ukrainian relations in the last century. Its ethnographic section (Knihovna národopisného oddělení Národního musea. Praha 5. Petřínské sady 97) houses most old texts dealing with folklore and popular tradi-

tions. The Charles University Library (Universitní knihovna. Praha 1. Klementinum) houses many pre-twentieth-century texts and has a large collection of Hungarian language materials dealing with Transcarpathia. In addition the Slavic Seminar within the Faculty of Philosophy (Knihovna slovanskeho semináře) at the university holds a list of Ph.D. level theses (diplomové práce) on subjects of interest to Ukrainian linguists and literature specialists.

2. ARCHIVAL SOURCES.

The National Literary Archives (Literární archiv památníku národního písemnictví) is housed in two separate locations in Prague and Stare hrady. The second location is of particular interest, as it contains the papers of figures such as Levko Bykovsky, Volodymyr Doroshenko, Ivan Franko, Oleksander Kolessa, Natalena Koroleva, Borys Lazarevsky, Ivan Pankevych, Mykola Pavlichuk, Volodymyr Tukalevsky, František Tichý, and Ivan Zilynsky. Particularly voluminous and as yet unexplored are the holdings on Doroshenko, Kolessa, Pankevych, Pavlichuk, and Tkalovsky.

Nineteenth-century Czech-Ukrainian relations constitute a further largely unexplored dimension of the archival holdings. Contacts between Czech activists and the Kharkiv School of Romantics have received some attention, but more detailed studies of Václav Hanka's and František Lladislav Čelakovský's attitudes to Ukrainian culture await their researchers. The extensive correspondence of František Řehoř with Franko and many other Ukrainians, including local priests and activists, provides a rich, as yet untapped, vein for researchers of both intellectual and social history.

The National Museum (Knihovna Národního musea) contains the personal archives of Czech political and cultural activists from the end of the last century. The archives of figures such as Jan Ryska, who published several articles jointly with Dmytro Doroshenko, František Hlaváček, who knew Franko and Volodymyr Hnatiuk, and Antonín Hajn, who was involved in the language debates in Transcarpathia during the twenties and thirties of this century, are all to be found here.

The Archive of the City of Prague (Arkhir hlavního města Prahy) has materials on the Ukrainian Civic Committee and the Ukrainian secondary school, including examination reports and graduation records for Leonid Mosendz, Ievhen Malaniuk, and Oleh Olzhych (Kandyba).

The Archive of the Czechoslovakian Academy of Sciences, which has been in existence since 1952, houses the papers of its members, many of whom had links with the Lviv-based Shevchenko Scientific Society (Naukove tovarystvo imeni Tarasa Shevchenka). It also contains an extensive collection of written materials and audio tapes devoted to dialectology. This was a strong interest of interwar Prague Ukrainianists like I. Pankevych and O. Kolessa; research was continued in the postwar decade. A Ukrainian-Czech dictionary, the fruit of sustained work by a collective headed by Andrii Kurymsky, ready for publication since 1980, has recently appeared in the USSR.

The Slavic Library (Slovanska knihovna) has a small, but constantly expanding, archive containing mainly correspondence with post-war Soviet Ukrainian authors.

In its archival section the University Library (Universitní knihovna) holds a number of manuscripts dating back to the eighteenth century and discovered in Transcarpathia and Halych by Iuliiian Iavorsky in 1930–1.⁸

The correspondence and papers of several figures are also to be found in private hands. This concerns writers such as Oleh Olzhych, Natalena Koroleva, Oleksander Oles, and figures such as Kornelii Zaklynsky, the last director of the Ukrainian museum in Prague.

As a whole, Prague constitutes a decidedly underused resource for Ukrainian studies. Although some graduate dissertations were produced in the fifties and sixties, the flow has since abated. The formerly strong team of Ukrainianists at Prague University has recently been reduced to two, and there are fears that both positions will be lost after retirements in the near future. Both the archival and the human resources, which include university personnel, archivists, and established writers,⁹ continue, however, to attract researchers and provide rich and readily accessible sources of information.

NOTES

1. The author wishes to thank the University Research Committee of the Senate at the University of Manitoba without whose financial assistance this paper could not have been completed.
2. The fullest documentation of the Prague emigration's activities can be found in Symon Narizhny, *Ukrainska emigratsiia. Kulturna pratsia ukrainskoi emigratsii mizh dvoma svitovymi viinamy*. Chastyna persha (Prague 1942). The same author has documented

the struggle to save the Museum of the Ukrainian Liberation Struggle in his *Iak riatuvaty Muzei vyzvolnoi borotby Ukrainy* (Zurich 1959). The ten-year existence of the pedagogical institute has been documented in Ivan Mirny, *Ukrainskyi vysokyi pedahohichnyi instytut im. M. Drahomanova 1923–33* (Prague 1934).

3. The fullest survey of Ukrainian holdings in the Prague libraries is contained in *Sto padesát let česko-ukrajinských literárních styku, 1814–1964*. *Vědecko-bibliografický sborník*, Orest Zilynsky et al. ed. (Prague: Svět Sovětu, 1968).
4. *Sto padesát let* lists holdings from 1574–1801 on pages 384–8, and nineteenth-century texts on pages 388–99. Major portions of the book are devoted to Ucrainica in Czech publications.
5. Only the Library of Congress (61,500) and the Harvard College and University Library (60,000) estimate larger Ucrainica holdings. See Paul Robert Magoci, "Ucrainica Collections and Bibliography in North America: Their Current Status," *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 23 (Winter 1987), 91.
6. For studies of the language question see Mykola Shtets, *Literaturna mova ukrainsiv Zakarpattia skhidnoi Slovachchyny* (pislia 1918). *Pedahohichnyi zbirnyk* no. 1 (Bratislava: Slovatske pedahohichne vydavnytstvo, 1969); George Y. Shevelov, *The Ukrainian Language in the First Half of the Twentieth Century (1900–1941): Its State and Status* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1988).
7. A fuller bibliography of these journals, compiled by P. Muraško, is to be published by the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies at the University of Alberta.
8. *Sto padesat let*, 382.
9. Post-1945 Ukrainian writing in Czechoslovakia has been surveyed in *Literatura chekhoslovatskykh ukrainsiv, 1945–1967. Problemy y perspektyvy*, Orest Zilynsky ed. (Bratislava: Slovatske pedahohichne vydavnytstvo, 1968).

The Dance of Dionysos in H. Khodkevych and D. H. Lawrence

Think of something compared to which Mozart's music for Figaro or a bacchanalian scene from the brush of Rubens seems awkward. Think of a dance, a real dance, devised after a delightfully clever plan—in which all that in your language is called theatre ceases to be anything other than the motifs and figures of a dance; the whole world put into masks and dancing with the most exuberant, unrestrained gestures—the whole burden of life transformed not into dark-glittering dreams as in Shakespeare but into whirling movement; even the most insolent insolence ennobled by a nameless rhythm.

Hugo von Hofmannsthal
Prologue to Aristophanes' *Lysistrata*

Dionysos or a “god of paradox,” as Walter Otto¹ names this ancient mythical character, has always been present in Western culture. Studying the ancient world, contemplating about the uniform patterns of cultural development, the attention of thinkers, critics, and writers invariably turned to this “mad god.” Nonetheless, Dionysos never enjoyed the position in the history of thought that was more prominent than in 1900, i.e., until the appearance of Nietzsche's version of Dionysos in his *The Birth of Tragedy*. There Dionysos appears as a judge of human civilization doomed to total destruction: “All that is now called culture, education, civilization will one day have to appear before the incorruptible judge Dionysos.”²

Later, Freud,³ having accepted the Nietzschean Dionysos at face value,

would present his own vision of human civilization and Dionysos' new role. Freudian Dionysos would offer a universal cure from omnipresent anxiety in the utopian world, unburdened by civilization and freed from the restrictions of civilized morality. Freudian prescription is a direct reference to "Dionysian paradise," without mentioning the name of the "mad god." On the eve of the Freudian psychoanalytical discoveries the cult of Dionysos becomes prominent in modern literature, and the writers, who allegedly have no knowledge of Freud, anticipate most of his concepts through the same familiar mythical figure—the ancient "god of paradox." This paper deals with the theme of Dionysos in David Herbert Lawrence (1885–1930)⁴ and Hnat Khodkevych (1877–1938).⁵ A native of Kharkiv, Ukraine and of Eastwood, Nottinghamshire, England, independently from each other, return to Dionysos and happen to be the two representatives of numerous writers-precursors of Freud and the psychoanalysts. Dionysos unites these two different artists and thinkers who sing their hymn to life and re-create the same ancient dance. Then, who is Dionysos?

THE ANCIENT DIONYSOS

In the ancient past he was usually associated with wine, having another name—Bacchus—god of wine. Nonetheless, such authorities on the Dionysian cult as C. Kerényi,⁶ Park McGinty,⁷ Erwin Rohde,⁸ and Walter Otto claim that "wine has nothing to do with the original nature of Dionysos."⁹ According to Otto and Kerényi, he is the god of ecstasy and terror of wildness and the most blessed deliverance—the mad god, whose appearance sends mankind into madness. The scholars agree that Dionysos was the son of Zeus, but as Robert Graves puts it: "the mother of Zeus's son Dionysos is variously named: some say she was Demeter, or Io; some name her Dione; some, Persephone, with whom Zeus coupled in the likeness of serpent; and some, Lethe."¹⁰ Otto claims she was a mortal woman born in the fairyland Nysa, that got its name from the female inhabitants nysai, and Dio-nysos—the divine from Nysa or the Nysos of Zeus.¹¹

According to Rohde,¹² the cult of Dionysos came to Greece from Thracia and Phrygia and was condemned by the Greeks for a long time. They feared Dionysos, this god did not belong to the Olympians. The classicist Williamowitz maintains that, "the society in which and for which Homer wrote his poetry wished to know as little as possible of Dionysos as did Hellas later on, until it had to yield to a movement which came from be-

low."¹³ Dionysos was a taboo topic not only in Homer's days, but much later as well. Why was he feared so much? Dionysos was associated with ecstasy, madness, utmost abandonment of daily duties, defiance of order, and appreciation of life in its Otherness. Frequently called "Zagreus" or "Subterranean," Dionysos undermined the established social order and gender hierarchy as its basic foundation.

"Dionysos is a woman's god," states Bachofen in his *Mother Right*.¹⁴ In his view, Dionysos' "appeal was primarily to women; it was among women that it found its most loyal supporters, its most assiduous servants." (130) Women propagated his cult, since he "presented a marked affinity to the feminine nature." Plutarch describes the Dionysian celebration in the following characteristic symbols—a wine jar, a vine, a goat, a basket of figs, and phallus. The essence of Dionysian cult is the escape into the mountainous area, mad sensuous ecstasy, and female abandonment of motherhood and nurturing for the sake of other pleasures. Some claim that ancient cult celebrations were even connected with sacrifice of males. Nietzsche and Freud revived the ancient god of rebellion and frenzy in their search for better civilization and human happiness. The civilized and yet discontented Man was bound to rediscover Dionysos.

MODERN DIONYSOS IN DISGUISE OF NEW TRUTH

The source of Khodkevych's novel was the popular folk song *Pavlo Marusiak i popadia*¹⁵ about the tragic love between the beautiful priest's wife and the leader of the Galician rebels in the eighteenth century. Khodkevych's Marusia from the novel *Kaminna dusha* is the restored legendary image reinterpreted by the modern Ukrainian writer. D. H. Lawrence's women in his novel *Rainbow* differ completely from the Ukrainian female character in Khodkevych. Nonetheless, both modern novels preserve the common semiotic model, namely the ancient Dionysian cult provides the cohesiveness of the corresponding plots and governs the discursive effect. Much like in the ancient Mediterranean, the female protagonists in both modern novels rebel against the established social hierarchy and seek "some new Truth." D. H. Lawrence's women in *Rainbow* and Khodkevych's Marusia in *Kaminna Dusha* step into the realm of the ancient mad god. Both modern writers follow their characters into the Other World where humans are totally free from the old restrictive civilization, where law, order, duty, and propriety no longer exist. They seek new Truth. Echoing Nietzsche, Hnat Khodkevych and D. H. Lawrence sing their own

hymn to the ancient mythic world, to the paradoxical Dionysos and female rebellion. Their women retreat into the fairyland of sensuous pleasures seeking new Truth and another mode of Being.

Khodkevych takes the Ukrainian readers into the strange world of the feared ancient god. Anticipating the Dionysian celebration, his Marusia

wished she could reach the sun, the mountain tops, the clouds. Her heart would stop at the very thought that warm days come soon, the snow would leave all the hills and she could climb the highest hill, stand there and sing!

Marusia felt the coming of the Earth's celebration with her entire being. It felt as if some magic had entered Nature and spread itself to people, pouring out and intoxicating them with its smell. As if thousands of eyes were opening. The body of the Universe was full of some tense work, some struggle and new triumph of a new Truth.(28)

The same new Truth would be claimed by D. H. Lawrence in his *Rainbow*. The preamble to the escape into Otherness would be the panegyric to Nature and natural biological cycles that presumably hold this new Truth:

They knew the intercourse between heaven and earth, sunshine drawn into the breast and bowels, the rain sucked up in the daytime, nakedness that comes under the wind in autumn, showing the bird's nest no longer hiding. Their life and interrelations were such; feeling the pulse and body of the soil. . . . (2)

Much like the ancient Thracians, Phrygians, and Greeks, D. H. Lawrence and Khodkevych enter the world of the feared and sacredly desired Dionysos. They are enchanted with the wisdom and beauty of Nature and, through their fictional characters, temporarily exist in the dream universe of eternal joy and happiness. Temporarily they entertain the idea that the salvation of humanity and recovery from the disastrous failures of civilization lies in this simple, peaceful, harmonious natural habitat that is free from the burdensome intellectual pursuits. The writers test for the moment the possibility of emulating the biological cycles of simpler organisms. The ancient mad god whispers into the ears of their characters, seducing them into his land of simple pleasures and endless enjoyment of life. Let us hear the Ukrainian variation of the same Dionysian melody:

Propagate and multiply with joy; and fill the Earth with the desire to live, longing for love and yearning for unification. One could breathe it day and night, in every drink, and in every piece of bread, and in every fruit. It was everywhere, in every force, in every natural thing, pouring into the river of poetry, joy, and Life itself. (37)

It is remarkable that the image of the mountains accompanies Khodkevych's Marusia in her journey into the mythical land of her "new Truth." The ancient "Nysa" is revived in the lovingly re-created Carpathian mountains:

It is delightful to drink the sounds and songs of the mountain streams. It is delightful to revel in the fathomness of Life and let your eyes sink in the tender dreamy luminaries!

It is a delight to live and feel oneself a daughter of the Great Mother Nature. . . . (55)

The modern Ukrainian writer allows his character to engage in the mad dance, in tune with nature, emulating the female frenzy of the ancient Dionysian celebration. His Marusia is unhappy in her marriage and rebels against the burden of the social institution and order running after her own rainbow dream. The Ukrainian modernist, anticipating Freud and his followers, prescribes complete biological freedom to his character. To cure Marusia's anxiety Khodkevych leads her through the Dionysian bacchanalia of flesh helping her to discover her inner self.

After the journey into the land of Dionysos, his female protagonist is left as discontented as before. The rebellion against the civilized order leaves the same aftertaste as the rigid superimposed structure of civilization. However, the Dionysian episode helps Marusia to obtain her new vision of the World and acquire the ability to read the social text:

I had been dreaming, and my life was passing by, and I was not bringing anything into it, not giving. I allowed it to play with me, as if I were a toy, a doll, giving pleasure to others and content with giving it. I did not enter life as an active participant, who had a right to demand payment for the job done. I had been a pretty charming parasite. (174)

D. H. Lawrence, the "scandalous writer" who shook the literary world

with his depiction of the "dark-souled desires" would follow the same path—through the Dionysian ecstasy and escape from the intellectual pleasures to the glorification of human intellect and condemnation of the Dionysian frenzy. The English worshipper of Dionysos, Anna Lensky from D. H. Lawrence's *Rainbow*, eventually asks the same questions as Khodkevych's Marusia. After the initial intoxication with the Dionysian pleasures comes the moment of enlightenment and sober analysis of existence.

"Why do I live?" a question that was previously asked by a male protagonist in the earlier works is now asked in the modern novels by D. H. Lawrence's Anna and Khodkevych's Marusia. Much like Marusia, D. H. Lawrence's Anna finally reaffirms the power of human intellect and returns the civilized order to the discontented human beings. The seductive Dionysos is abandoned for the sake of the previously discarded intellectual search. His Anna poses for the following thoughts succeeding the "Dionysian dance":

She almost against herself, clung to the worship of human knowledge. Man must die in the body, but in his knowledge he was immortal. She believed in the omnipotence of the human mind. (162)

It is remarkable that the belief in the "omnipotence of human mind" is mediated by a woman. The traditional worshipper of the mad god of paradox paradoxically denounces the cult of sensuality and rediscovers new truth in the old burdensome civilization. Within the space of a single literary work the two modern writers manage to relive the decades of search for psychoanalytical truth and offer an optimistic alternative to the entanglements of libido and primordial instincts.

Anticipating Freud and the psychoanalysts, D. H. Lawrence and Khodkevych not only conduct their artistic experiments but obtain data which undermine the future psychoanalytical concepts. Through the fictional world of their protagonists, the English and Ukrainian writer relive the post-Dionysian trauma and discard the corruptive god of madness. It is not Dionysos who happens to be the judge of human civilization, but the human mind being worshipped by the former traditional servants of the mad god. The Nietzschean "incorruptible judge" is transformed into a female, and the carnivalesque gesture of a modern writer offers a new economy for the intellectual endeavors of human beings.

Unlike Freudian women who “represent the interests of the family and sexual life; the work of civilization becoming men’s business,”¹⁶ D. H. Lawrence’s Anna and Khodkevych’s Marusia eventually refuse the imposed slavery of the Body and worship the Mind. They cure themselves from the post-Dionysian trauma and come to the realization that human life is more than a feast of the biological pleasures. Through Anna Lensky D. H. Lawrence defiantly challenges Freud and his preaching of the libidinal magic:

her deepest desire hung on the battle, that she heard far off, being waged on the edge of the unknown. She also wanted to know and be of the fighting host. (3)

The dance on the mountains ends with the panegyric to human mind and the unknown power of intellect. The most “immoral” and the most controversial writers paradoxically proclaim the slogan of the utmost morality in their seemingly most provocative modern works. After the Dionysian frenzy there comes a moment of catharsis through enlightenment. The voices of the modern writers suppressed by the Dionysian melodies and the prolonged psychoanalytical interpretations provide not only aesthetic pleasure, but significant food for thought as well. After all, Freud would later recognize that “writers discovered psychoanalysis long before I did.”¹⁷ Does it take Dionysos or a lengthy dance of concepts and ideas to discover “the new Truth?”

NOTES

1. Walter Otto, *Dionysos, Myth and Cult* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1965).
2. Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy and the Genealogy of Morals*, Francis Golfinch trans., (New York: Doubleday, 1956), 120.
3. Sigmund Freud, *Civilization and Its Discontents*, vol. 54 (Chicago: Britannica Great Books, 1952).
4. David Herbert Lawrence, *The Rainbow*. The novel appeared in 1915, “was seized by police and declared obscene.” See *The Oxford Companion to English Literature*, Margaret Drabble ed., 5th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), 553–5. The work demonstrates the author’s interest in human psyche, indirect influence of Nietzsche and anticipates his own work on psychoanalysis (*Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious* [1921]). For more on Dionysos in D. H. Law-

- rence see P. S. Sharma, *The Rainbow—A Study of Symbolic Mode in D. H. Lawrence's Primitivism* (Hyderabad, India: Trust Publishers, 1981); P. T. Whelan, *D. H. Lawrence: Myth and Metaphysic in the Rainbow and Women in Love* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1988).
5. Hnat Khotkevych (Khodkevych), *Kaminna dusha* (Kyiv: Dnipro, 1981). The novel (*The Stony Soul*) was written during 1908–11. The author had various intellectual pursuits beyond his original training as an engineer, music, theatre, ethnography, history, and literature among them. He translated Shakespeare, Hugo, Schiller, and numerous other Western and Eastern authors. His literary work is virtually forgotten by the literary scholars, despite the fact that the novel *Kaminna dusha* is mentioned as an example of Ukrainian modernist work. The author, who translated Schiller, must have had access to Nietzsche even in the original German. This novel is his tribute to Dionysos and Nietzsche. See introduction by Oleksa Zosenko, "Hnat Khotkevych i yogo povist" (Dnipro 1981), 3–14.
 6. C. Kerényi, *Dionysos*, Ralph Manheim trans. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976).
 7. Park McGinty, *Interpretation and Dionysos* (The Hague: Mouton Publishers, 1978).
 8. McGinty characterizes Erwin Rohde as a romantic interpreter of Dionysos (*ibid.*).
 9. Otto, *Dionysos*, 55.
 10. Robert Graves, *The Greek Myths*, 17th ed (London: Penguin Books, 1978), vol. 1, 56.
 11. Otto, *Dionysos*, 61.
 12. *Ibid.*, 58.
 13. *Ibid.*, 53.
 14. Kerényi, *Dionysos*, 130. There is more on the topic in Maria Daraki, *Dionysos* (Paris: Arthaud, 1985); Helen Deutsch, *A Psychoanalytic Study of the Myth of Dionysos and Apollo* (New York: International Universities Press, 1969); G. P. Guépins, *The Tragic Paradox* (Amsterdam: Adolf M. Hakkert Publishers, 1968).
 15. Zosenko, "Hnat Khodkevych."
 16. Freud, *Civilization and its Discontents*, 783.
 17. Ann Meredith Skura, *The Literary Use of the Psychoanalytic Process* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981).

An Interview with Stanislav V. Kulchyts'kyi

Stanislav V. Kulchyts'kyi, Candidate of Economic Sciences and Doctor of Historical Sciences, is head of the Department of the History of Socialist Construction of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences Institute of History. Kulchyts'kyi is a specialist on the Soviet economy in the 1920s and 1930s, and during the past several years he has focused his research on collectivization and the famine in Ukraine in 1932–33. Among his many works is a recent monograph entitled *1933: Tragediya holodu* (Kiev 1989). Kulchyts'kyi participated in the conference “Ukraine under Stalin, 1928–1939,” which was held in Toronto on March 2–4, 1990, under the sponsorship of the Chair of Ukrainian Studies and the Centre for Russian and East European Studies of the University of Toronto. The following interview was given in Toronto on March 4, 1990.

During the past two or three years you have been studying the problem of collectivization in Ukraine. You are doing research on this topic and publishing articles in the press and in journals. I would like to ask you how you got started on this subject. What led you to study this problem?

I worked for many years on the problems of industrialization in Ukraine. I have published several books on this topic. Understandably, in the course of this work I always came up against the problem of collectivization, because the problems of collectivization and industrialization are not only tightly interwoven—in essence, they form one problem. It is the problem of building a new society in our country during the 1920s and

1930s. What were the intentions and what sort of deformities were there, resulting in what we got? Naturally, because of this my interest in the situation in the countryside grew. And when the need arose to study it in depth, I simply reoriented myself. One can say that I restructured myself. I left, although I hope not forever, the problems of industrialization and became occupied with what took place in the village.

Already in 1985 and 1986, I began working more or less seriously in the archives, and I wrote a report to the Party's Central Committee about the crisis in agriculture in the early 1930s and how it manifested itself. I was advised to prepare an article based on this report and to publish it. We have our own journal, the *Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, and my first article on the agricultural situation in the early 1930s actually appeared in the third issue of the journal in 1988.¹ By that time, one can say that it was possible to call things by their proper names—that is, to say that, yes, there was a famine.

You're saying that until then this was a topic that was being avoided.

This was a theme that was avoided, of course. It was a problem that was avoided. And not because there were someone's instructions that had to be carried out. No, I don't think so. It was simply along the lines of inertia—for many, many years. The whole point is that the famine was proclaimed as not being a reality at exactly the time when it was taking place—that is, in 1933. And this was indeed a rule imposed by Stalin for all phenomena in the countryside connected with the famine of 1933. There was no way to get around this; it was not possible. So, the years went by, the decades passed. After the Twentieth Congress [of the CPSU], there was a great deal of interest among the entire population as to what really happened in the countryside in the early 1930s. The fact that one could not speak about the famine did not mean that no one knew about it. On the contrary, in every family someone had suffered. All this was clear and obvious. All that needed to be done was to study it.

In order to be precise, allow me to backtrack. You said that you wrote a report, an outline of the problem, and submitted it to the Central Committee in 1986. What exactly did you write in that report? That this was a problem that needed to be researched? Is that how things are normally done—a historian submits a report to the Central Committee stating that a certain problem should be clarified?

Strictly speaking, this is not a scholarly problem. It is, above all, a political problem. Therefore, of course, I had to raise it at the level of the Central Committee.

So this was a kind of proposal arguing that we have to deal with this problem and asking, can we do it? Is that right?

That is correct. But I want to say that this was not my proposal. A commission set up under the US Congress was working on the famine in Ukraine in 1933. And the results of the commission's work also became known to us, as in the rest of the world. And we, the Ukrainian scholars, were being asked more and more frequently: "What is this? How can you respond to this issue, which is posed by life itself and not just by the results of the US Congressional commission?" Therefore, the time was right for this question to be raised, especially after the fiftieth anniversary of the famine was marked throughout the entire world in 1983. It was an event that naturally concerned us as well. In this report, I simply put forward my own understanding of the problem. And I was advised to make this available to all historians by means of publication in order to initiate a discussion. But not just a discussion; also to delineate the path of scholarly research in this area.

As I already mentioned, you have been dealing with this topic for a number of years. Can you tell me what general conclusions, scholarly conclusions, you have drawn on the basis of your research and, I assume, your work with certain archival materials? You are aware that, obviously, there are various views with regard to the famine issue. How would you present the conclusions of your scholarly work?

When I and some of my colleagues in the department began working on this topic, we—this is of course unavoidable—went along the same paths that were once followed by scholars in the West. Two questions that had to be answered came up right away. The first was the number of victims of the famine. Actually, one can put it in broader terms—i.e., the demographic consequences of the famine. Because these were of such magnitude that this was how the problem had to be formulated. The second was why the famine was possible. Was this an unexpected result of economic policy—that is, unexpected by those who created this policy? Or was this, if one is to use the language of jurists, premeditated murder—that is, was the grain collection used only as a means to destroy the peasantry, a goal that Stalin set for himself and went about achieving? In other

words, famine as genocide. Specifically, famine whose final aim was precisely to accomplish the genocide either of the peasantry in general—there are such positions and ideas—or of the Ukrainian peasantry alone.

And what were your conclusions?

I feel that, in order to understand the problem of the famine of 1933, one cannot look at it in a purely emotional manner. When an ordinary person—not a professional scholar—becomes acquainted with all the materials, they make such an impression on the human imagination that one automatically asks oneself: “Why did this happen, how was this possible?” And this emotional point of view that, aha, Stalin did everything to destroy the Ukrainian people is very widespread. I feel that the issue is not only the Ukrainian people, although it was the Ukrainian people that suffered the most because of the famine. The issue is the “leap” that Stalin began to implement beginning in 1929, the year he declared to be the year of the great turning point; or the year of the accelerated construction of socialism on all fronts—that is, not only in the cities (industrialization), but in the villages as well (collectivization). And if one is to view it from this angle—this is of course the only existing scholarly approach—then this must be the point of departure. And it must be acknowledged that we still know the results of this “leap” only very poorly, including the methods used to accomplish it; although we do know something of these methods. But the results we know only poorly, both here and in the West.

In the West, the famine has been studied for more than fifty years. A great mass of material has been accumulated. I am already familiar with this material. Earlier it was stored [in the Soviet Union] in closed holdings (*spetskhrany*). All these books were in closed holdings. Now, closed holdings have been liquidated, and all these books have become available to anyone who is interested in reading about this and studying it. In the West, a more emotional point of view is prevalent—i.e., that this [the famine] was done in order to bring the peasantry to its knees. To a certain degree, this point of view is legitimate, because in pursuing this economic policy everything was done in the worst possible way as far as the peasantry is concerned. And when it was necessary to get out of the economic catastrophe to which this Stalinist “leap” brought the country, then the ruling circles—the Party-state apparatus that was completely under Stalin’s control—resolved the problem at the cost of the peasantry.

What do I mean by this? Already in 1932, there were grain collections

that were extraordinarily immense in their volume, just as they had been in 1931 and 1930. It was through the grain collection that the “leap” in industry was being accomplished. So in 1932, there was already degradation, the economic degradation of the village. And the peasantry had stopped giving. Actually, it is more correct to say that those great quantities of grain could not be squeezed from them anymore. That grain was later exported and provided the necessary resources for purchasing machinery. Under these circumstances, the “leap” could have been stopped. The designated pace for the growth of industry and capital construction could have been slowed down. This would have been the wisest policy. Stalin chose a different path. He sent special commissions to the countryside. In Ukraine, the special commission worked under the leadership of Molotov. In the Volga region Postyshev was in charge, and in the Northern Caucasus it was Kaganovich, although Kaganovich also came to Ukraine precisely with regard to these matters. And in the winter of 1932–1933, from the Ukrainian peasantry, just as from the peasantry in the Northern Caucasus and the Volga, they squeezed out practically everything there was. All the reserves were squeezed dry. And what were these reserves used for? Well, first of all to supply, through the rationing system, the urban population and the new construction sites—that is, the working class; for export; and so on. And the village was left without bread.

Stalin thought—obviously, I cannot speak for him as to how he visualized all this—but the materials point to the fact that he thought there was still some bread left for the peasantry, that the peasants were hiding this bread. No, they were not storing it away, and they proved this with their very lives when they began to die of hunger. And when they began dying of hunger, Stalin simply decreed that everything was to be kept quiet, that nobody should talk about it. No one was to mention the word hunger at Party conferences. And it is here that Stalin’s taboo had its effects on the very problem of the famine. One can say that a curtain of silence came down on the countryside. And this is what transformed the famine into an extermination famine. Yes, many would have died from the famine; of course, many would have died. But if other regions of the country had been given the opportunity [to help]—for example, Belorussia. It was never a major grain producer, but all the same there were some supplies there that they could have shared with neighboring Ukrainian oblasts. And not only Belorussia. Nor did Stalin ask for help from abroad, where

they learned about the famine in the Soviet Union. Volunteer aid began to be organized there, but shipments of grain were stopped at the border, in Poland where they had been collected. They were stopped at the border. And it was announced that "we do not need any grain," that "there is no famine here."

Well, how does one explain all this? Actually this brings me to my next question. We are here at the conference "Ukraine under Stalin." During the past three days, the topic of the famine emerged as one of the most important and interesting. There has been a great deal of discussion on this theme. As we have already noted, there is the view among a number of Western researchers that the famine was a policy formulated by Stalin not just against the peasantry, but exclusively against the Ukrainian people. These views exist. You heard a number of analyses by Western scholars. What is your reaction? Did any of these arguments influence you? Are there grounds here to revise some of your conclusions? In general, what are your impressions of the discussions that took place here at our conference, specifically with regard to collectivization and the famine?

I feel that we have come to a certain agreement here concerning the problem of the famine's victims. This is an important scholarly problem, and we should know, after all, how many people died in Ukraine in the 1920s and 1930s from collectivization, from deportations, from the dekulakization of the peasantry.

Can a concrete figure be given, in your opinion?

Yes. Both I and Sergei Maksudov, who is at the Russian Research Center at Harvard University, and an Australian scholar, Stephen Wheatcroft, had the opportunity in December of last year and at the beginning of this year to be in the Central Archive of the National Economy in Moscow, where at just that time the [data on the] demography of the 1930s were made available. This was everything that had been kept tightly closed up for many decades, as soon as Stalin ordered it. All this is now open and has become accessible to specialists for study. Not just our own Soviet specialists, but all others, as you can see. And so Maksudov and I and Wheatcroft presented papers at this conference. We have different approaches, and we cited different figures, but we referred to the same sources. And after we had presented our papers we decided to get together, to study all our material, and to come out with one article signed by the three of us—a joint position on this question. The article is not yet

ready, there are only some random thoughts; we will write and publish it in perhaps a month. But we came to the following agreement: that we can talk about a loss of population in Ukraine in the vicinity of some 4 million people between the two censuses of 1926 and 1937—that is, over a period of exactly ten years. (In point of fact, the 1937 census is called “the suppressed census.” It was first kept secret, then falsified, and even the falsified results were a completely secret document. And now we know all this. We can study all of it.) What part of this 4 million is accounted for by the year 1933 itself is something we have not yet determined.

But in any case, these are the demographic losses—that is to say, direct losses of the population. These are abnormal deaths. On many occasions, I have spoken and written articles about the demographic consequences of the famine of 1933. I want to say that I even came up with “inflated” figures of the famine victims. In what sense? I also took into account those who had not been born—that is, I took into account the drop in the birth rate because of the famine. These are also demographic results of the famine. The drop in the birth rate comes close to 1 million people. This is a very large number; but these are not direct losses. And our joint position is 4 million over ten years. Of these, no fewer than 2.5 million are accounted for just by the year 1933.²

As to whether the famine was directed towards destroying the peasantry or whether it was the unavoidable consequence of an economic catastrophe that was made worse by a policy based on pulling out of that catastrophe at the cost of the peasantry—here I am not of two minds. But I feel that discussion of this topic will continue for quite some time—that is, at the present level of our knowledge regarding the character of the development of the economy of the 1930s, the question cannot be answered. I feel that the real reason behind the famine was an economic policy directed towards the building of a [type of] society that is not capable of existing—that is, a society without a trade and market economy. Stalin did not announce this, but everything he did was directed towards forming such a society. And, in the natural sphere, it cannot exist. By the way, Lenin, when he rejected War Communism in 1921, called the policy of War Communism an economically impossible policy. Stalin did not acknowledge this. He did not recognize the experience gained from our economic construction in the early years of Soviet rule and the Civil War years. And he crossed over, as I said, in 1929, to this “great leap.” Unfortunately, we do not have anything on this either in Western or in Soviet lit-

erature. This Stalinist “great leap” was not researched from this point of view because the archives were closed. And we should concern ourselves with this now.

By the way, I know that in September of this year there will be a conference in Kiev on the famine. Soviet scholars, of course, will participate, as well as scholars and specialists from the West. What problems will be discussed there? Where did the initiative for such a conference come from?

Well, you know that various decisions connected with resolving some of these purely scholarly problems have been accelerated now. Our specialists travel to the West, and specialists from the West come to us in Kiev. And, of course, it was on the initiative of the writers—above all our writers, and the “Memorial” Society, on the Soviet side—and on the initiative of scholars who study the problem of the famine in Ukraine in Canada—and not only Canada—that the decision was made to organize this conference. Specifically, I know that James Mace, who is the head of a scholarly research group of the US Congressional Commission studying the problem of the famine in Ukraine,³ will also be taking part in the conference and is on the organizational committee.

The program of the conference has not been worked out yet in detail; this will depend on who is invited to attend. But it is quite clear that the most important issues will be debated: the general agricultural policy of this period; the question of losses due to the famine; the question of the reasons and motives behind the economic policy and the political decisions connected with 1932–33 and the mass destruction of the peasantry; the export of Soviet grain at that time; and, I think, a variety of other questions.

I would like now to move on to a different theme, a more general but no less interesting one—i.e., the problem of perestroika in your institute, the Institute of History. I have the impression—perhaps you feel differently, in which case please correct me—that this process in Kiev, this process of perestroika in historical scholarship, has been very complicated. I also have the impression that our literary critics, our writers in Kiev, Lvov, and other cities, moved forward much faster in filling in these “blank spots” in the area of literary history, which is quite closely related to historical scholarship as a whole within the framework of Ukrainian history in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. I know that Russian historians

also set about doing this work much faster, and perhaps even with greater success. I have in mind the publication of such historians as Karamzin, who, one must say, has nothing to do with either Marxism or socialism but has rather a lot to do with the history of the Russian state, and with a specific direction at that. What can you say about this? How is perestroika in historical scholarship proceeding in the Institute of History? Are my impressions correct to some extent? What are your impressions?

The Institute of History is only one institution. I would pose the question in more general terms, concerning historians as a whole. Where they work is not particularly important. Historians are truly slower getting into perestroika than literary scholars; this has to be admitted. And those articles on historical themes that already began appearing in 1987 in our press were written for the most part not by historians but by publicists. But it is always easier for a publicist than for a professional historian, because a historian must address these various question through archival materials. And it is necessary first of all that there be perestroika in the archives, and then later among those who make use of these archives. The process of perestroika in the archives is very difficult, very painful. You know about this. There were a number of pieces in *Izvestia* on how the archives are opening up their secrets. But this process has also begun, and along with it we too have begun perestroika. I have already emphasized that the biggest such secret was the demography of the 1930s, which has already been opened up. And, furthermore, it is open to everybody, to foreign scholars as well as our own.

But is it open only in Moscow, or in Kiev as well?

Aha, it's open in Moscow. We in Kiev simply do not have these kinds of materials. Unfortunately, such demographic statistics were not saved. I know that we have only a very, very limited number of materials from the 1939 census. The main body of materials is kept in Moscow. Well, I myself am a member of the commission dealing with the opening up of archival materials for widespread use. And if one is to talk about the slowness of this work, then I should talk about myself—I am not working so diligently in this direction. But, one way or another, work is progressing. And the reading rooms in our archives are now full; earlier they were empty. Now they are full of people who are studying these so-called blank spots.

You mentioned Karamzin. I could name a historian who, in terms of his influence on our Ukrainian historical scholarship, did no less than

Karamzin did for Russian historical scholarship. This is Hrushevs'kyi. In the process of developing the republican program of historical research, which we began after the appropriate resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine in February of last year,⁴ we decided that we would publish a huge amount of the work of the classics of historical scholarship. Because their work is at present inaccessible; it was either destroyed or simply not saved. And this section of the republican program is very large. The draft program includes forty-four publications in ninety-six volumes encompassing the work of thirty-seven authors. These are the classics of historical scholarship. The overall volume will encompass more than 3,500 printed sheets, and one-third of this will consist of the scholarly legacy of Academician Hrushevs'kyi. Preparation of his selected works is under way; these will include *The History of Ukraine-Rus'* in ten volumes (fourteen books) and *The History of Ukrainian Literature* in six volumes. The two-volume *Social-Political Movements and Religion* and his correspondence, prepared by contemporary compilers, will be published separately. We will also reprint the two best-known works of the historian: *The Illustrated History of Ukraine* and *The Outline History of the Ukrainian People*.

Yes, I am aware of that resolution, and I read the interview with you in *Radyans'ka Ukraina*.⁵ This is a very ambitious program. Not long ago, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine again examined the problem of historical research in Ukraine, and the Central Committee adopted corresponding resolutions: one on the "blank spots" and another specifically on the famine.⁶ What does this amount to? Why was it necessary to once again adopt special resolutions after the program on the development of historical research had already been decided upon?

Well, these resolutions deal precisely with the "blank spots" of Stalin's era. This is the least researched period, if one takes into account that everything we published earlier came from Stalin's *Short Course of the History of the VKP(b)*. This was the carcass with which we dressed up this fact or the other—that is, it was not history as a science, but something politicized that did not correspond to anything and did not satisfy any of the public's needs. And, inasmuch as one or another aspect of historical scholarship is tied to the political appraisal of this or that leading figure, this or that Party decree of the 1920s and 1930s, we cannot do all of this without the help of

the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine. So this resolution on “blank spots” was adopted. Almost immediately thereafter, there was a separate resolution on the famine of 1933. What was the reason behind this resolution, frankly speaking? It was necessary to obtain permission to publish high-level Party documents—documents of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, documents of the Central Committee of the VKP(b), connected with the problems of this period in Ukraine. This could not be done without the appropriate permission of the Central Committee itself. And that is why this resolution was adopted. It also has a purely concrete aspect regarding the publication of a collection of documentary materials that will consist of approximately 200 documents, a collection that is large in scope. It will be published by the Ukrainian Politydav at the end of this year.

And not just the famine, but other “blank spots.” I am aware, for example, of a resolution that is being drawn up now concerning the problems of research in the Academy’s Institute of History, where I work. Specifically, it will reexamine a resolution adopted by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine in 1947 regarding the Institute of the History of Ukraine of the Academy of Sciences of Ukraine.⁷ This resolution will be duly condemned as unjust, as one that fundamentally retarded the development of historical scholarship, and some trends in research that are the most topical will be outlined.

This is most interesting. These plans can only be welcomed. But I would like to ask you something about Hrushevs’kyi. On the basis of what I have read in the Kiev press, I have the impression that not all scholars appraise Hrushevs’kyi so positively. I have in mind the well-known historian Vitalii Sarbei, who, in my opinion has certain reservations concerning the “overrating” of Hrushevs’kyi.⁸ How do you view this?

I know Vitalii Hryhorovych Sarbei very well; he is a colleague of mine, he is head of an adjacent department. And he is doing a great deal of work now on exactly this problem—preparing a monograph on Hrushevs’kyi’s historiographical legacy. You see, there can be no two opinions about Hrushevs’kyi. He is the most fundamental figure of Ukrainian historical scholarship. And—perhaps not everyone is aware of this—even when we badmouthed Hrushevs’kyi on all counts, when we kept his works locked up tightly, not allowing doctoral candidates to read them, and so on, even then we made use of the factual material that is in Hrushevs’kyi’s work.

Many of the archives perished. But his immense volumes remain the only witnesses to that history; it can only be found in these volumes. Clearly, Hrushevs'kyi will remain forever.

But Hrushevs'kyi was not only a historian. He was also a political figure of very high rank. And it is completely understandable that some standpoint of his, some concrete appraisals in his political activities, could evoke reservations on our part—in fact, different ones in different people. I think the time will come when we will know more about Hrushevs'kyi. Especially when we become acquainted with his two volumes of correspondence. There will be a more objective view of his activities during various periods. But we will, of course, continue to criticize certain of his positions.

One specific question. Not long ago, I read an interview in *Robitnycha hazeta* with Volodymyr Mel'nychenko, and there I learned that he has moved to Moscow, where he is head of the Sector of Historical Sciences in the Ideology Department of the Central Committee.⁹ For me, it is extremely interesting that such a sector even exists. And my question to you is this: Do you feel—inasmuch as this is probably your colleague from Kiev—that this could have some sort of positive impact on the development of historical scholarship in Ukraine, in the sense that a historian from Kiev now holds a rather responsible position in the apparatus of the Central Committee in Moscow?

Well, I deeply respect Professor Mel'nychenko, who earlier worked in the Institute of Party History of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine. He was the deputy director of this institute and headed the Party archives. And actually it was he who began this major work on the research into the famine of 1933, the compilation of these Party documents. This work was later continued by his deputy, Ruslan Yakovych Pyrih.¹⁰

In conclusion, a traditional question. What are you planning to work on now? Will you continue to study the famine?

Well, my own personal plans as a scholar are to study the problem of War Communism after 1921. Actually, I dream about this, because I do not know how things will work out in terms of time. Here lies the question of Stalin's so-called leap to communism—that is, after the year of the great turning point of 1929, the economic catastrophe of 1933, and the famine, and so on. This all has to do with the problem of the famine. But I

would like to deal with this from the inside, focusing on economic policy, on the economic processes that were taking place, and to study the entire formation of that economic mechanism that we are now restructuring with such great difficulty, attempting to move on to an economy that respects the laws of the market.

But I also have many other plans. The point is that we have a large collective of professional historians. We are, for example, preparing a major work on cooperatives in Ukraine, the cooperative process in the 1920s. This year we are planning to hand over to the publishing house Naukova Dumka a large collection of documents entitled *Sutsil'na kolektyvizatsiya i holod na Ukraini v 1929–1934 rr.* This is the chronological time frame, with new documents. These will not be documents from the Party archives that the Institute of Party History is publishing this year. These are documents from the state archives that show collectivization through the eyes of the peasants. We have discovered a vast number of letters written by peasants to the editors of newspapers, and in these letters — which were never published in those newspapers but were kept in their archives—we have the history of collectivization, the kind [of history] that should be made available to everyone.

NOTES

1. S. V. Kulchyts'kyi, "Do otsinky stanovyscha v sil's'komu hospodarstvi USSR u 1931–1933 rr.," *Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, no. 3, 1988, 15–27.
2. In a recent article adapted from a forthcoming book on the subject, Kulchyts'kyi writes that, on the basis of the 1937 census data, "the population deficit" in Ukraine resulting from the losses of the 1933 famine—and not including the repressions, which assumed massive proportions after the assassination of Kirov—totaled at least 6,074,000 people (see Stanislav Kul'chitsky, "Golod: Neskol'ko stranits tragicheskoi statistiki," *Soyuz*, no. 3, 1990, 14).
3. James Mace is staff director of the Commission on the Ukraine Famine.
4. See *Radyans'ka Ukraina*, February 3, 1989.
5. "Istorychna nauka: Novi rubezhi," *Radyans'ka Ukraina*, December 15, 1989.
6. See *Radyans'ka Ukraina*, February 4 and 7, 1990.
7. The resolution was adopted on August 29, 1947 (see *Kul'turne budivnytstvo v Ukraini kii RSR, cherven' 1941–1950: Zbirnyk dokumentiv i materialiv* (Kiev: Naukova Dumka, 1989), 308–19).
8. In his introduction to a book published in 1956, Sarbei characterized Hrushevs'kyi as "the sworn enemy of the Ukrainian people" (see V. Belyaev

and M. Rudnyts'kyi, *Pid chuzhymy praporamy* [Kiev: Radyans'kyi pys'mennyk, 1956], 5). For a more recent and restrained appraisal, see Sarbei's "Do pytan-nya pro naukovu spadshchynu akademika M. S. Hrushevs'koho," *Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, no. 10, 1989, 114–26.

9. *Robitnycha hazeta*, February 2, 1990.
10. Pyrih is a candidate of historical sciences. In February, 1989, he was identified as head of the Science Sector of the Ideology Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine. He is currently deputy director of the Institute of Party history in Kiev.

Reintroducing Vera Lysenko— Ukrainian Canadian Author

The personal nature of Vera Lysenko's writing cannot be appreciated until her art is reconciled with her life experience. To date, this has not been accomplished. The small amount of evaluation and criticism which exists is based entirely on Lysenko's three major works and on fragments of biographical information, much of which is inaccurate. What exists is a deficient portrait of the author and her works, compounded by a limited perspective.

Hitherto, the biographical documents necessary to a complete understanding of Lysenko's personal life and public writing have been unavailable to scholars. This paper therefore represents the first attempt to link the life and works of the author. It will show that the structure of Lysenko's literary works rests on a foundation of personal anguish, conflict, and determination. A detailed biography is forthcoming, but for present purposes, only those biographical details deemed pertinent to a better understanding of Lysenko and the influences on her fiction are presented here. Most of this information is drawn from the unpublished autobiographical novels *The Torch* and *Rooted Sorrow*. Although research has included published sources and interviews with Lysenko's family,¹ friends, and associates, our focus is on the accounts which Lysenko, herself, classified as autobiographical in order that she might have the first and dominant voice in this retelling of her life story.

Vera Lysenko was born in Winnipeg, in 1910, the fourth child in a Ukrainian family of six children. Her parents, Andrew and Anna (Mowchan) Lesik, members of a Protestant sect, the "Stundists," fled their

homeland of Ukraine because of tsarist tyranny and religious persecution. In 1903, they settled into a home in a multi-ethnic, working-class district in North Winnipeg. This North End neighborhood, with its quaint frame cottages crowded with immigrants, is where Lysenko was born and raised.

Lysenko's childhood was a capsule which contained a mixture of events and situations that would influence the writer in later years. In the family home, Lysenko felt financial and emotional stress and the tensions in the household were compounded by the poor conditions which existed in the immigrant community. Lysenko, a sensitive child, was not immune to the events which unfolded around her.

In *The Torch* (TT), Lysenko recalls the worry that never ceased when she was a child because the Lesik family, like many immigrants, suffered serious financial hardship. In 1918, the situation worsened when Lysenko's father suddenly lost his job at the lumber yard. Immigrants like Andrew Lesik received no understanding. The effort of the man, his usual good performance on the job, and his long years of service were not acknowledged; instead, he had to deal with the humiliation of being labeled a foreigner and was denied the opportunity to earn even a meagre living. Lysenko saw the blow to the man's self-esteem, the wounded pride when he felt unable to provide for his family. She felt that "something of my father's life dream had vanished" (TT 26). For Lysenko, the economic crisis was compounded by the dread of the nearby tenements. She feared that her family would be crowded in with the people "... in those dark rooms full of rats, with the outside stairs where people go who have no hope, where every month the death wagon calls from the city to pick up those who died of hunger" (TT 17).

Along with the fear and intense sense of insecurity at home came the revelation that Andrew Lesik was not alone in his trouble. Lysenko became anxious as she heard that there were forces in motion which would alter radically the lives of all the immigrant workers (TT 17). Lysenko listened as their neighbor spoke passionately about the plight of the immigrant worker, especially under the bullish camp boss, an Englishman named Ed Stevens (TT 21):

Came the lesson. Ed Stevens meant what he said. He was hard as a slave driver. The bunks were hard, cold. The food—you could hardly eat it without vomit. Meat is needed for a man doing a job that nearly kills.

But the meat was tainted, and I choked on the pie. Flies. Mosquitoes. Swamps. Fever. Dysentery. Tiredness. Men were working with torture in their souls. Pants full of shit. Weak in the stomach. Hot in the head. Sweat stinking from the armpits. Feet hot in heavy shoes. Muscles strained and faces red.

Came a dreadful July day. In that long line of workingmen—Ukrainians, Poles, Greeks, Roumanians, Germans, Italians—I know not from what country of the world—not one face was not tanned dark by the sun, and sweat poured like water. The sun, like a molten ball of lead, lay heavily and hotly in the heavens above, and scorched us, and I wiped my brow and prayed for deliverance. And I was the second heaviest man there, and regular as a clock, with no letups. Then suddenly one man dropped dead. A cry of rage, a howl of worry rose from the man, but the foreman was furious . . . (TT 22)

The impact of the words stung Lysenko. For the rest of her life, she would remember “Solidarity—that’s the word” (TT 25). She was a daughter of the working class, and her own future was dependent on the united efforts of the North End workers.

At the same time that Lysenko was realizing the economic hardship and the struggle of the immigrant workers, the effects of war were becoming apparent in the neighborhood. Each day, Lysenko saw the growing number of black armbands worn by her classmates who had lost their fathers in the war (TT 27). Distant battles claimed the lives of heroes who left families behind in Winnipeg. At Lysenko’s school, children were suddenly orphaned. For many of her schoolmates, dreams of higher education were wiped out as their widowed mothers were reduced to the level of begging for work along the streets in order to feed their starving children: “The strength and vigor and hope and comfort and security of our North End was being drained off and the victims of the war were legion . . .” (TT 27).

Of significant note, in *The Torch*, Lysenko concentrates on women as victims of the war. In the chapter “To Those Who Have Fallen in Darkness,” Lysenko recounts the stories of the widowed, of young women broken by grief, and girls ruined by returning soldiers who used them for sexual pleasure without thought to the results (TT 27–37). Numerous pages are devoted to the telling of the stories of female suffering, but there is no mention of the returning wounded or men who had served at the front.

In late November, 1918, "a pall of fear hung over the streets" (TT 39) as an influenza epidemic spread through North Winnipeg. The threat of disease was felt strongly in the Lesik home as their father recounted the horror of the neighborhood tenements where absentee landlords refused to remedy the deplorable conditions. Lysenko watched as funeral coaches came more frequently, black satin streamers marked houses in mourning, and the common sound was that of mothers screaming in grief for lost children. The spectre of death was always present. This was part of the heavy price, the bitter lot of immigrants to Canada (TT 41). In the midst of the dreaded epidemic, Lysenko fell ill. She developed a raging fever and lay near death. During her long convalescence, Lysenko's sister Eugenie gave her a gift of orange paper and a white writing pad, and Lysenko produced her first book, *The Story of the Fish Who Wanted Everything*:

You can imagine the pondering, the sweep of a child's imagination, the calling into being of other fantastic creatures, the busy scribbling of pencil on paper until this tale became an accomplished fact and emerged, somehow or other on fine white paper, and then was bound, with the help of the family, into its orange cover, and shown about to all the neighbours. (TT 50)

This was, however, the last time that Lysenko was to enjoy a sense of unity with the family. The period after her illness brought no relief from insecurity, and as time passed, Lysenko felt more removed from the family circle.

In 1919, Lysenko witnessed events which left a permanent impression on her, and made a significant mark in the history of labor in Canada. As the month of April wore on, the labor unrest in Winnipeg was growing increasingly worse. Sinister happenings began to occur as toughs began to appear in Winnipeg streets as a threat to the workers who were uniting to protest the intolerable conditions. Tensions were at a high when a bulletin appeared in the daily press which caused the wrath of the North End workers to explode. A "Citizens' Committee" which was opposed to the idea of a strike placed the advertisement which read:

Get out of town, FOREIGNERS! All those who were born in foreign countries should be deprived of all their property and sent back to Europe, and their claims against this country cancelled and all their legal

rights taken away. We do not tolerate troublemakers who are provoking riots in the streets, are in favour of destroying private property and are arousing decent workers to revolt by lies. Get rid of them before they ruin our country. (TT 61)

Many of the North End workers who were of foreign origin had hesitated about joining in a strike but the hateful advertisement caused a furor and Lysenko's incensed neighbors could no longer hold back.

On May 2, 1919, the metal workers went out on strike; soon they were joined by workers from all over Winnipeg. In *The Torch*, Lysenko recalls:

There was a stream of angry men on the street. Every kind of worker on earth was there, every nationality, English, Scotch, Irish, Ukrainian, Russian, Pole, French, Yiddish, Spanish, Italian, Bohemian, Serb, Swede, Iclander. From the four corners of the earth they had come to build Canada. . . . The whole North End was on the move—the eruption of a vast immigrant howl of labor which the lordly profiteers had exploited too cruelly and had supped too richly on the profits—and the effects were to be staggering on world labor. I saw them in the street, and my childish soul was stirred to the root. (TT 62)

Lysenko felt a sense of direct involvement and she observed the transformation as “. . . faces of immigrants changed and became more assimilated with a common cause. The strikers were no longer European, and they served a just cause” (TT 71). The Winnipeg General Strike had a great impact on Lysenko, and prompted her later involvement in pro-labor organizations such as the Ukrainian Farmers and Labour Temple. Throughout her life, Lysenko remained conscious of her working-class background. All of her works, fictional and nonfictional, at some point show sympathy for the struggling masses.

Shortly after the strike had subsided, Lysenko suffered a tragic loss. The one strong emotional bond in her life was her “partnership” (TT 75) with her younger sister, Nadya. The sisters bore a strong resemblance and were close in age. Lysenko felt a strong interdependence in the relationship with Nadya (TT 75), and when Nadya met with death in a streetcar accident, Lysenko was devastated. Together, Lysenko and Nadya had been united, but suddenly “. . . I was alone, at nine years old, and stripped of my fun and my gladness, because the older children did not respond to

me, they were out for a bigger share of life . . . and I would have no protection of a little girl's love and need for me . . . " (TT 77). Lysenko's best friend was gone. A feeling of isolation and solitude developed as grief intruded into the Lesik household. Lysenko's mother withdrew in mourning; her father, weighed down by the burden of coping with his own sense of tragic loss, while attempting to tend to the family needs, often retreated in silence behind a newspaper (TT 83). Lysenko felt that she was alone and caught in the fallout of emotional crises. In later years, Lysenko had difficulty portraying close family relationships and happy childhood.

For Lysenko, the early years were filled with pain and little joy. She had to develop her own survival mechanisms. Lysenko found escape and kinship on the prairie (TT 84). The elements of nature were her playmates. She drew strength and was stimulated: "Nature was the most splendid teacher I was ever to have, and I gloried in her lessons . . . " (TT 88). She absorbed the beauty of nature and used it to cushion the agony of the times, and as an impetus for learning.

As a child Lysenko was unusually bright. She was "a beautiful girl with long yellow curls, lovely brown eyes, and a keen, enquiring mind."² When an older neighborhood friend named Isabel took Lysenko to school "to show her off," the teacher, Mrs Potter, was moved to invite the child to continue to attend.³ Lysenko had an insatiable hunger for knowledge. Her early interest in school was the natural result of the emphasis on education in the Lesik family. Learning came easily to Lysenko and she was determined to become a genuine scholar. Mrs Potter's invitation to continue attending school was readily accepted, and the problems of the North End dissolved temporarily as Lysenko spent an increasing amount of time on study and the reading of books. Every Saturday morning she would take a place at the low round tables in the Children's Department of the Carnegie Library and ponder the volumes which contained "... fantastic stories which appealed to a distressed child who had to live so much in the world of the imagination" (TT 127, insert 2). On holidays she would retire to the playhouse that her father made, and spent long afternoons enjoying her favorite copy of Hawthorne's *Tanglewood Tales*, and other stories that were like magic for her (TT 157).

Lysenko's retreat into books brought her comfort. She grew confident of her place in the academic world. The more she read, the more she learned, and her performance at school was consistently excellent. Lysenko's parents were delighted by her scholastic progress and the com-

mitment to education was a bond between Lysenko and her father. For her twelfth birthday, Lysenko's father brought home "a monumental size ledger (used by a bookkeeper in his firm)" (TT "Attic Memories" 2) which contained hundreds of unused pages. The gift was intended to encourage her scholarship. Lysenko used the ledger to record private entries of favorite poems, sketches, and observations of her experiences as a growing girl.

The practice of keeping a journal caused Lysenko to develop greater awareness of the situation at school. Until that time, Lysenko had enjoyed certain privilege as Mrs Potter's favorite and the excitement of learning new things had captured her full attention. However, when she set down on paper her observations about personal growth, her vision broadened. Lysenko began to scrutinize the influences, events, and problems which surrounded her at school.

At the age of twelve, Lysenko recognized the significant role of the teacher. Although she realized that the beauty of music and literature taught at school sustained her and soothed her schoolmates, Lysenko saw teachers who had no genuine understanding of or sensitivity to the serious problems of the North End children:

But the beating of a child's frightened heart she did not hear; the yell of a kid who was beaten by a strap in the hands of an angry and overworked father she did not take cognizance of; the appeal for a chance to confide in her by a girl so scared by the problems of puberty that she sat desolate and weeping straight through literature class, she impatiently averted; the problems of growing youngsters who seethed with impatience and lies and deceit and hell in their brain she did not understand; the inability of an overworked girl who had been misused as a dru[d]ge by her family to respond to the nobility of great poetry was met by her with scorn. . . . So the literature class, sponsored to help growing youth in meeting the demands of immigrant fathers for a chance at higher education for their offspring, fell short of expectations . . . and the singing class, where music soothed and charmed, failed to register the proper response in the girls especially. . . and a sinister force, operating in subterranean channels, to frustrate, dismay, and thwart growing ambitions of adolescents, was permitted to grow unchecked, until finally disaster threatened almost every girl and boy in that turbulent community. . . . (TT 161)

Lysenko's sense of class consciousness was awakened. She saw that children of immigrants received no support within the school system. The students from the North End were not accepted readily and the stress that the pupils experienced was tremendous. Truancy was high among the North End students (TT 155). They were caught in the clash of Old World and New World cultures and values. Prejudice against the children of immigrants was a reality. Expulsions were numerous (TT 155). Minor infractions often resulted in the maximum penalty of immediate dismissal. Older boys desperate to find work as trained workers crammed themselves into desks that were too small and received "the instruction of foolish, ill-trained women who catered to the desire to best these 'foreign devils' by beating the daylights out of the kids" (TT 155). Lysenko witnessed the common occurrence of the oldest children in families being forced to drop out and find work in order to help ease the family's financial plight (TT 155). She was appalled at the stories of child labor that she heard her schoolmates relate. Many girls were forced to take jobs in order to help out financially at home (TT 164). At the age of twelve, Lysenko concluded that most of the North End girls would be sacrificed (TT 170). Few females would ever realize the dream of higher education, and many would break physically under the burden of toil; some would even perish in the struggle:

And so, interwoven with the memories of the beautiful songs we had been singing in our music class, were threads of discord, disappointment, aching hearts and tragedy. . . . The girls of this period in Winnipeg's North End had sad destinies, many of them . . . and the Grim Reaper strode among them, demanding a life here and a life there . . . and yet there was among us, daughters of immigrants, such a yearning for music, for poetry, for the chance to reach out beyond the narrow confines of our homes. . . . (TT insert 1 before 174)

Lysenko felt sympathy for the girls who would not have the opportunity to continue their schooling, but she herself was secure in the knowledge that she was destined to go on to university. Unlike the other students from her background, Lysenko received the assurance of her teacher that her future was promising. Lysenko felt deep concern for her schoolmates, however, and she was determined to make an effort to draw the student body together in better understanding. The children of

immigrants were considered to be socially unacceptable and the opportunities for full participation in school activities were limited. Lysenko sought to break down the barriers of isolation. She put together a class newspaper and reported events of interest, recognized individual achievements, shared Ukrainian recipes, and included creative works of poetry and stories (TT 175). The newspaper was well received at school and Lysenko's confidence in her own abilities was bolstered.

When she was fourteen years old, Lysenko went to Saskatchewan to spend the summer with her grandmother, and those months left a permanent impression on her and did much to give her direction as a writer. Lysenko recognized her grandmother as a spontaneous poet: "Granny was a true folk poet and words came easily to her when they dealt with the earth and sky and their denizens" (TT 289). The turmoil of North Winnipeg was miles away as Lysenko listened to endless hours of her grandmother's accounts of the early days in Canada: "Something of the grandeur of pioneering life got into my blood that summer and remained forever after" (TT 249). Her grandmother imparted "the warmth of family, solidarity" (TT 149). The effect of the visit was one of genuine edification: "But I was gathering strength and resilience from my Granny and the tight clutch of poverty loosened and I saw there was a way out for me and I was not alone, but had a tradition behind me" (TT 254).

Lysenko's grandmother spoke strongly about the hardships of serfdom and confided that she had a dream of having a writer in the family, someone to preserve in words the plight of the Ukrainian people. From her aunt Nadya, Lysenko heard the family history. Her aunt prodded Lysenko's heart and conscience. Aunt Nadya and Lysenko's uncle Terence Mowchan described the persecution that the family had suffered because they were Stundists. They spoke of the family's determination to pursue knowledge wherever possible, and of how they were punished by the authorities because they were suspected of receiving and reading books. Lysenko's aunt charged her: "You alone will remain to carry the torch our family lit in the Ukraine. You are destined to be the biographer of all our adventures" (TT 299-300).

During the months that Lysenko spent in Saskatchewan, she received the positive reinforcement that had been lacking in her life. She was given the strength of family history and tradition and the challenge to preserve the ideals by writing. Lysenko came to see that her role was to be the champion of the oppressed. Lysenko gained new insight into the circum-

stances of immigration and the hardships faced by the immigrants, and she felt compelled to bring this awareness to the reading public. In *The Torch*, Lysenko records the impact of her visit to Saskatchewan:

The movement of immigrants—which was to be a dominant theme in my writings in later years became a reality, and I was conscious of the big push from betrayed countries by young adventurers who travelled thousands of miles to find a new home. . . . My visit to Saskatchewan had given me a strong impetus in the direction of storytelling, poetry and history which culminated in mature life with several volumes relating this great Canadian epic. (TT 363–4)

In September 1924 Lysenko entered high school. On the first day of classes, she was placed in the Grade Eleven honors class (TT 367). She astonished her English teacher with her knowledge and ability. Despite the fact that Lysenko achieved an academic standing of over 95 per cent, the highest in the class, and first in Manitoba (TT 388), she had to endure constant “sneers and snubs” (TT 384) at school. Lysenko was a member of the immigrant, working-class community, and therefore regarded as inferior. The harassment and discrimination directed at the Ukrainian students went unchecked by the school authorities. Many teachers were of the opinion that “it is not worth educating children of the lower class” (TT 417). Lysenko found the situation difficult to endure. She joined a group of Ukrainian students to protest: “First, against being called foreigners. Against being all lumped together as undesirable. Against being stigmatized as reeking, violent Galicians” (TT 393). Lysenko was disturbed as she saw talent smothered, students with great ambition fall as casualties in school tragedies, and violence inflicted against many of her cohorts (TT 401–12). In reaction, a swelling of pride rose among the Ukrainian group which Lysenko had joined and they became more militant:

It's the whole cossack host on the march to glory, in defence of liberty. It's our desire to hang on to our identity, to keep from being swallowed whole. Our colour, our dance, our music and drama—everything we brought to Canada to be undervalued? We're just tame, colourless, uncultured folk, forever doomed to hewers of wood and drawers of water? No! We protest! Young in heart—all of us are—but old in experience of life. We've all been poor and called unclean and deprived and too

thrifty for our own good. . . . We assert our right to education, culture, a high place in our country's history. (TT 394)

Lysenko was sustained by the united determination of her associates. They would not yield to the pressure but would persevere in the quest for recognition and the opportunity for advancement through a post-secondary education.

In 1925, at the age of fifteen, Lysenko began studies at the University of Manitoba. She had achieved superior standing in high school and was awarded the University of Manitoba scholarship.⁴ For Lysenko, the years at university were complicated by the tension caused by her academic ambitions and her personal situation. She came from a background where basic survival was a priority and the display of fine clothes and status symbols at university were a sharp contrast. Lysenko was younger than the average student and not prepared for the worldliness that she encountered. Activities such as modern dancing were new to her "and although my physical being was aroused, I was not prepared for the fury of the sexual rhythm which was far beyond a person of my tender years" (TT 435).

At university, the prejudice was more severe and Lysenko witnessed the humiliation of the North End students. Her sense of outrage swelled. She wanted to challenge the misconceptions about her class. Lysenko tried to bring a fresh interpretation to the material studied, but her views were often perceived as radical because Lysenko saw from a different perspective. Although she regarded herself as a scholar, Lysenko felt a kinship with the oppressed peasant and the struggling immigrant worker (TT 618). Bitterness rose within her as she thought of the failure of the academic world to regard the plight of the working class:

. . . hatred and disillusionment had set in for me: hatred of upper class snobbery which blindly refused to see the coming plight of Canadian workingmen . . . disillusionment at the meagre fare dealt out by the professors in the senior honors literature courses which I was taking, their sneers, their dullness, their spite for me, their lack of challenge, their failure to interpret the spirit of the age properly. (TT 634)

Attitudes of intolerance were firmly entrenched within the established ac-

ademic system, but Lysenko's strong academic performance contradicted the preconceived opinions of students from the North End.

Despite the difficulties encountered, Lysenko did exceedingly well until the last year of her studies. Over the years, Lysenko experienced increased emotional stress at school. At home, there was tremendous upheaval. Lysenko's mother became pregnant and had a son at a time when all the older children had moved on to adulthood. Lysenko had difficulty in defining her relationship with her new brother. The age difference between the siblings placed them in different generations and, in time, Lysenko became more of a surrogate mother than a sister to her younger brother, Peter. The alteration in the family situation created new problems and Lysenko, a person who was driven by emotion, found it difficult to handle the combination of domestic tensions and academic pressures. In the last year of her studies, Lysenko became ill and could not cope. For weeks, Lysenko occupied a small room that her mother had arranged to be Lysenko's private place. The time was spent retreating into the world of literature, which was her constant source of strength and stimulus for thought and creativity.

When Lysenko received her B.A. (Honors) in 1930, she was one of the first Ukrainian Canadian women to obtain a university education, and on the day of convocation, Lysenko made the solemn dedication:

This will be my aim—to remain steadfast. Shevchenko had no home, anywhere, no marriage, and was a wanderer over the Russian Empire, and forever an exile? Franko was harassed by debts, almost blinded, driven mad with persecution? And yet he wrote as he saw the suffering and enslavement of his people, "I cannot rest, my bed is one of cinders?" Torture was their part, but immortality their reward. They stand first among the Ukrainian people for their heroism, but they will not be the last to make a stand. I now dedicate my learning, my gift and my pen to continue the advancement of ideas and progress in our country. I shall read to you one fine pronouncement of Ivan Franko, and thus conclude:

Give me the fire that turns words into torches,
Fire that can sear people's souls give to me,
Fire that serves truth—and injustice scorches,
Passion's white heat! (TT 637)

Driven by the sincerity of her convictions, and the realization that she must leave home if she was to attain her goal to become a writer, Lysenko, like many of the characters in her works, imposed her own form of self-exile.

After she left Winnipeg, Lysenko held numerous occupations in order to support herself. She first went to Alberta where she was a nurse and high school teacher. In 1936, Lysenko moved to Eastern Canada and there she worked as a saleswoman, teacher, factory hand, night school instructor, domestic servant, research clerk, and journalist. As a single woman, Lysenko knew the difficulty of trying to survive on low wages. She experienced the exploitation of female workers who were paid less than their male counterparts, or forced into ghettoized industries, such as the garment trade. In 1936, Lysenko wrote an exposé, "The Girl Behind That 'Bargain'" (*Chatelaine*, October 1936). The article revealed the deplorable situation which existed in the garment industry; while huge profits were amassed by the companies, the female employees were paid starvation wages.

Lysenko's personal experiences, along with the fact that traditional Canadian political parties showed little concern for the immigrants and working class of Canada, resulted in Lysenko fraternizing with leftist political groups. She wrote articles under various pseudonyms and her commitment to social reform was unshakable. Her work appeared regularly in the leftist paper *The Clarion*, and in 1942–43, she was also associated with *Ukrainian Life*. Lysenko did translations of French novels for the *Magazine Digest*, and published various political articles using distinctively Ukrainian names in that publication. She did book reviews and essays for the *Globe and Mail* and was a reporter for the *Windsor Star*, until 1943, at which time she was approached by members of the Association of United Ukrainian-Canadians and was asked to write her first book, *Men in Sheepskin Coats: A Study in Assimilation*, the first history of Ukrainians in Canada written in English by a member of their own ethnic group.

The research for *Men in Sheepskin Coats* was a major undertaking which took almost four years to complete. The effort was funded by the personal financial contributions of members of the A.U.U.C. and they exercised full editorial control. The original manuscript, entitled *They Came from Cossack Land*, was over 600 pages in length. Cuts were made (the published work is 302 pages plus bibliography), the title was changed, and the work was edited to suit the political views of the sponsors.

When Lysenko set out to write a history of Ukrainian Canadians, her intention was "to explain the great romance of migration of my people to Canada" (Pierce 2001[a] 2) and show how "the destiny of the Men in Sheepskin Coats was bound up with the destiny of Canada" (MISC 3). She hoped "to bring forth a broad picture of Ukrainian-Canadian life over a period of fifty years" (Pierce 2001[a]23, 3). Lysenko's motives were simple and sincere; at no point did she intend to extend any particular political view. Unfortunately, Watson Kirkconnell, a noted Canadian academic, chose to ignore Lysenko's sincere endeavors and tried to discredit her work. In an unsolicited "review" sent to Lysenko's publishers, Kirkconnell charged: "An interesting combination of authentic research and Communist propaganda is *Men in Sheepskin Coats* by Vera Lysenko . . . " (Pierce 2001[b] 51-1). While Kirkconnell did allow that "[t]he bulk of the book is an excellent and readable account of the settlement of the Ukrainians in Canada and their advance in two generations to positions of affluence and distinction. There is also an admirable summary of the Ukrainian cultural legacy," he went on to declare that "[u]nfortunately this appetizing dish is laced with political arsenic" (Pierce 2001[b] 51-1). Kirkconnell took exception to the material presented on twelve pages of Lysenko's book but exaggerated his findings to include the entire work. Along with the unsolicited "reviews," Kirkconnell made false accusations about Lysenko's political affiliations. His motives for such strong actions are unknown. Kirkconnell was a self-appointed protector of the Ukrainian community and, as such, would have been expected to give encouragement to Lysenko for her efforts and scholarly achievements. However, the fact which emerges is that Kirkconnell was determined to destroy Lysenko's credibility and label her as a Communist.

On March 9, 1948, Lysenko made a sworn declaration that she was not and never had been a member of the Communist Party, the Progressive Labour Party, the Ukrainian Labour-Farmer Temple Association or Ukrainian Canadian Association.⁵ Lysenko also submitted to her publishers a thirteen-page detailed reply to Kirkconnell's review, portions of which were later published. She convinced Frank Flemington, of Ryerson Press, in an extensive interview that she had never been a Communist and was not trying in any way to glorify Communism in her work. Flemington threw his support behind Lysenko, sent a memo to Lorne Pierce with the comment that Kirkconnell appeared to be a fanatic who wanted a fight, and issued a letter to Kirkconnell that legal action was a serious consider-

ation. Kirkconnell modified his statements but the damage had been done. Kirkconnell was well respected by the Ukrainian community. His opinions had major impact. Consequently, Lysenko lost support within the community. The very people whom she hoped would benefit from her work failed to recognize what was accomplished on their behalf. Lysenko suffered terribly and had to endure public humiliation. Financially, she made no gain. Her reputation as a sincere and serious writer was shattered. Lysenko experienced severe emotional problems and the psychological scars which resulted from the incident never faded.

Years later, in *Rooted Sorrow* (RS), Lysenko recalls the shock and pain of the Kirkconnell-Sheepskin episode:

On the appearance of my first book, *Men in Sheepskin Coats*, a social history of my people, the Ukrainians in Canada, an attack was made upon it, smearing me and accusing me of a communist bias. . . . It was vile, unexpected, utterly unjustified, and made by a person occupying some position of authority in Canadian literary life. It was handed to me by the Editor, Dr. Lorne Pierce, and I could not believe what my horrified mind registered. . . . *Dangerous Red Propaganda Must be Exposed*. . . . A sick feeling overwhelmed me. Fury, ungovernable, surged through me and my fingers trembled as I took up the purported review of my social history of the Ukrainians in Canada. What on Earth? I could hardly believe what I was reading. Every sickly, distorted accusation of a mean and perverted personality was hurled at me by a man purporting to be a disinterested scholar with a name that Anglo-Canadians respected. (RS 200)

Lysenko goes on in *Rooted Sorrow* to detail the McCarthy-like treatment which she suffered and expresses her anguish at the lack of appreciation of her pioneering literary efforts:

I reviewed the events that had led to my undertaking the long, hard task of assembling materials for *Men in Sheepskin Coats*. The new trails I had blazed. The venturesome journey I had undertaken across Canada, visiting the chief Ukrainian communities. The severe personal sacrifices the work had entailed. The thousands of hours of the most painstaking, exacting research, described by the *Toronto Star* as "staggering." . . . I had delved deeply into the historical background, searched out books which seemed insignificant to most people, caught various phases of ac-

tivity which had seemed irrelevant until I had beautified them enormously and presented them to the Canadian people. . . . It seemed all the more shameful to me, this attack on me, the most vicious ever made on a Canadian writer, with its distortion of irrelevant facts, its aggrandizement of minutiae, its exaggeration of the least important aspects of my theses. (RS 200)

Lysenko was disappointed by the failure to find any support "when the writer is attacked on the basis of being a little too far ahead of his time. Anyone who speaks out against social injustice is immediately suspect." Lysenko came to the conclusion that it is

much better to be bland, to be "socially acceptable," and so our writers lose the force and power which writers of other nations can wield but seems so deplorably absent in our Canadian writers. "Be on the safe side, steer clear of labor problems, shut your eyes to social abuses, and you'll be on the side of the mighty." (RS 204)

For several years, Lysenko did not publish. When she resumed her career as a writer, in the 1950s, Lysenko turned to writing fiction. Her reasons for the change in genre were clearly the result of the painful experience of the Kirkconnell episode, and her personal commitment to rectify what she regarded as a deplorable situation regarding the representation of immigrants and ethnic characters in Canadian literature:

Seldom indeed does one encounter a character of, let us say, Slavic origin, in Canadian fiction, except in the role of an illiterate, a clown, a villain or a domestic servant. One exception may be noted: the Ukrainian Canadian heroine, Anna Prychoda, of Morley Callaghan's novel, *They Shall Inherit the Earth*. Yet Anna . . . possesses no distinctively Ukrainian traits; she might as well have been of French, Irish or Icelandic ancestry; Callaghan made no attempt to limn out the particular characteristics and problems of the second generation to which his heroine presumably belongs. The magnificent drama of migration and assimilation to Canada's Western lands of a polyglot population has not appealed to Canadian writers, mainly for the reason that consciously or unconsciously they still prefer to think of the non-Anglo-Saxon as a comic or uncouth personage, unworthy of elevation to the dignity of literary subject-

material... yet Canadian culture as such will not come of age until it embraces in its entirety the manifold life of all the national groups which constitute its entirety. (MISC 293-4)

Revitalized by her idealistic intentions, Lysenko published her first novel, *Yellow Boots* (YB), in 1954, followed by *Westerly Wild*, in 1956.

Shortly after the publication of her second novel, the CBC aired (January 1957) Lysenko's radio play about Ivan Franko, the renowned Ukrainian poet. Around that time, Lysenko became reclusive but continued to write. Most of the material which Lysenko wrote in the last twenty years of her life remains unpublished and rests in the Lysenko Papers in the National Archives of Canada. The collection indicates that Lysenko was both a prolific and a versatile writer. Among the manuscripts in the Lysenko Papers are two plays, *The Lady and the Pooks* (musical) and *Margaret Scott—The Angel of Poverty Row*, based on the real person Margaret Scott who, after the death of her socially prominent husband, became one of the first public health nurses to Winnipeg's poor. (A note of interest is that one of the characters in the play is Rev. Gordon, who was actually the Canadian author Ralph Connor.) The collection also contains a novel, *School* (1973), and the two autobiographical novels *The Torch* and *Rooted Sorrow*.

The unpublished Lysenko works attest to the fact that, although she was a woman trapped in poverty and plagued by health problems, Lysenko was determined to make a contribution to Canadian literature. The stress and lack of support resulted in Lysenko being hospitalized on several occasions but she persevered and refused to abandon her goals. In her last years, her retreat from the world caused her to withdraw from old acquaintances who attempted to re-establish contact,⁶ and her self-imposed isolation was almost complete. In October 1975, in Toronto, Lysenko died the way she lived most of her life—poor and alone.

These biographical facts present a portrait of a person who was deeply affected by the exigencies of everyday living. The events of her times caused her to develop a strong social conscience and a particular outlook which is reflected in the themes of her works. However, the directing force in Lysenko's life and writing was her pride in her Ukrainian immigrant roots and her determination to be accepted as a Canadian without surrendering her ethnic heritage. In order to reinforce this point, Vera Lesik wrote in English but deliberately took the distinctively Ukrainian pen name Vera Lysenko. Her first sense of identity was as the daughter of

Ukrainian immigrants. From this viewpoint she began by writing *Men in Sheepskin Coats*. When Lysenko turned to writing fiction she continued the expression of her Ukrainian nationality, through her character Lilli Landash, in *Yellow Boots*. Lysenko's work was like Lilli's song and "with this song, she paid tribute to those countless unknown song makers who had created the songs to immortalize the common incidents of their daily life, she added the hues of her own living to them, she acknowledged her debt to her own people for what they had given her" (YB 314).

In *Yellow Boots*, Lysenko picks up the threads of her personal experience and then, with Lilli, begins a new stitch as the second generation makes the transition from Ukrainian to Canadian.

NOTES

1. Lysenko's sister, Olga Vesey, takes exception to a few of the details which Lysenko relates in *The Torch*. However, in this excerpt I am faithful to Lysenko's account since personal recollection is an individual matter. What and how a person chooses to write about her life also provides insight, and my purpose, at this time, is to allow Lysenko to speak first.
2. Interviews with sister Olga, January 1987 and June 1989.
3. *Ibid.*, January 1987.
4. Lysenko's friend relates that Lysenko at first thought the award was an error and walked the long distance to the university to advise the authorities of the mistake. Lysenko would not accept the possibility of benefiting at the expense of another.
5. Peter Krawchuk, member of A.U.U.C., confirms that Lysenko had no formal political ties. According to Krawchuk, Lysenko did have leftist views, was strongly anti-fascist, and would best be described as "a social worker." Interview, Toronto, May 6, 1988.
6. Interview with Miss E. Hudson, Ottawa, October 1986.

Book Reviews

Norman Hillmer, Bohdan Kordan, and Lubomyr Luciuk, eds. *On Guard for Thee: War, Ethnicity, and the Canadian State 1939–1945*. Ottawa: Canadian Committee for the History of the Second World War, 1988. 282, xx pp.

This modest volume, a collection of papers originally presented to a symposium held at Queen's University in September 1986, is an attempt to digress from the traditional Anglocentrism of Canadian wartime history and explore some of the issues that touched upon the lives of Canada's citizens of non-English and non-French background during the period from 1939 to 1945. It contains essays by a wide assortment of contributors from an established authority on Canadian Second World War politics such as J. L. Granatstein, through Canadian ethnic historians such as N. F. Dreisziger and Bruno Ramirez, to federal civil servants working in the field of military history such as Norman Hillmer and David Fransen. The principal theme of the book is the interaction between the wartime Canadian government and Canada's various "ethnic" communities.

The volume opens with an essay by N. F. Dreisziger on the origins of the Nationalities Branch, a federal administrative organization which originated in government concerns to mobilize Canada's ethnic groups in support of the war effort and which during the postwar era was translated into the Citizenship Branch, the forerunner of today's Multiculturalism Directorate. William Young continues with a contribution on government information agencies during the war and concludes that they failed

to inform Canadians accurately about various ethnic groups and failed to defend these groups from the cultural chauvinism of the Anglo-Saxon majority. Robert Keyserlingk stresses the overreaction of the Canadian public and federal government to the dangers of a Nazi plot among German Canadians. Bruno Ramirez maintains that Fascism was identified with "Italianness" among Montreal's Italian community but that this was a largely non-political phenomenon which did not pose any real threat to liberal democracy in Canada. Bohdan Kordan and Lubomyr Luciuk accuse the Canadian state of bumbling in what they claim were its overzealous efforts to unite Ukrainian Canadians behind the cause. J. L. Granatstein and G. A. Johnson state the logic behind the evacuation of Japanese Canadians from the west coast in 1942 and seem to be trying to justify this terrible event. David Fransen explores the pacifist Mennonite response to the Canadian state's demands upon their material and manpower resources and argues that a compromise suitable to both sides was found in alternative service arrangements. Paula Draper and Donald Avery tell the story of Canada's reluctance to take in refugees of various sorts, partly due to ethnic bias on the part of the country's governing elite. Robert Bothwell reveals, however, that Canada did take in some refugee scientists who helped to develop Canada's nuclear program at the Montreal laboratory. Howard Palmer and Harold Troper offer some general comments from the point of view of Canadian scholars working in the field of ethnic studies while John English makes a few observations from the point of view of a traditional Canadian political historian. The commentators seem to agree that the ethnocentrism of Canada's dominant Anglo-Saxons had a negative effect upon the ethnic groups discussed in the book.

In general, *On Guard For Thee* is successful in portraying some of the difficulties raised by the questions of a multi-ethnic state at a time of war. These involve on the one hand, a government concerned with the promotion of national unity, security, and maximizing the war effort, and on the other hand, a variety of ethnic and religious minorities concerned with their own survival, and loyalty to their own hierarchy of values which sometimes differed considerably from those of the dominant political group. The government side of this equation is very well presented; the minority group side considerably less so.

Thomas M. Prymak
McMaster University

L. Y. Luciuk and I. L. Wynnyckyj, ed. *Ukrainians in Ontario*. Bulletin of the Multicultural History Society of Ontario, vol. 10, Double Issue, 1988. 298 pp.

For the past several years, the Multicultural History Society of Ontario has devoted special issues of its bulletin, *Polyphony*, to specific ethnic groups in the province. *Ukrainians in Ontario*, produced by guest editors Lubomyr Y. Luciuk and Iroida L. Wynnyckyj, joins earlier and much slimmer volumes on the Hungarians, Armenians, Poles, and Italians. Its predecessors, however, enjoyed far superior technical reproduction, as uneven print fading near the margins makes *Ukrainians in Ontario* annoying to read and, despite professionally executed maps and graphs, amateurish in appearance. With over forty articles, the book has all the weaknesses of a multi-authored work: variable quality, repetition of basic information, and beyond the general rubric of "Ukrainian" and "Ontario," no unifying theme or focus. What is best characterized as a grab bag of information past and present evokes the genre of popular local history, dominated by institutions, physical neighborhoods, personalities, and reminiscences.

Nine of the articles are geographically rooted, discussing Ukrainian life in Toronto (2), Waterloo and Wellington counties, Fort Frances, Sudbury, Windsor, Ottawa, Kingston, and Timmins. Another thirteen are devoted to specific organizations and their activities. The remainder cover topics ranging from the press and church architecture to Ukrainians and internment operations in Ontario during the First World War and the Plast girls' volleyball team that twice won the Canadian junior championship. Four articles describing published sources on Ukrainians in Ontario and major Ukrainian archival collections in the province aim to encourage research in a virtually untapped field.

Given the traditional neglect of the Ukrainian experience in Ontario, in a preoccupation with the historically more significant prairies, *Ukrainians in Ontario* is to be welcomed as a pioneering work. But the value of much of the minutiae the authors see fit to relay is another question. Does the reader really benefit from learning that the Future Bakery consumes 360,000 kilograms of flour in one week; that in 1891 Charles Horetzky lived at 88 Bedford Street in Toronto; that there are 20,000 entries in the *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*; that in 1985 it cost the Ukrainian National Federation in Sudbury \$100,000 to renovate its lower hall? This type of information would not be so irritating if narrow encyclopedic "facts sheets" uninter-

ested in the larger context, analysis or interpretation were not the norm. There are, of course, exceptions. Thomas Prymak relates the Oshawa flying school of the 1930s to the Canadianizing of the Ukrainian National Federation. Oksana Wynnickyj ties the Hryhorij Skovoroda kursy in Toronto to broader issues of pedagogy, multiculturalism, and the displaced persons' immigrant baggage; her concluding remarks are both thought provoking and suggestive for further research. Paul Robert Magocsi not only focuses on a much ignored subgroup, the Carpatho-Rusyns, but also deals with questions of national or ethnic identity. And viewed collectively, the articles testify to a recurring pattern in community development of modest origins, expansion, and decline that individual authors at times address directly and explore for implications for the future.

That many authors open not with the topic at hand but with what becomes a ritual summary of Ukrainian Canadian beginnings centered in the West suggests an attempt to place the Ontario experience in perspective. But the suggestion remains stillborn as the interplay of the two regions in their impact on Ukrainian Canadian life, and the relationship of the specific Ontario to the general Ukrainian Canadian experience, are rarely pursued, despite the groundwork laid in the editors' introductory essay. This is surprising in that if *Ukrainians in Ontario* can be said to have a broader frame of reference, it is that of Ukrainian Canadian history—not the local mainstream society that Ukrainians entered and lived within in different Ontario cities, or the provincial culture that the title of the book insists makes Ontario a valid focal point. Without comparisons between the course of Ukrainian Canadian life in Ontario and the group's national or prairie experience, accounting for differences and similarities and shifting balances, the relevance of "Ontario" to even Ukrainian Canadian history is thrown into doubt. What is distinctive or significant about the establishment, personnel, membership, ideology, and activities of Ontario branches of nationwide organizations? For all that they were painted and exhibited in Toronto, do William Kurelek's paintings of the Ukrainian pioneer experience in western Canada, based on his own boyhood, belong in a discussion about Ukrainian art in Ontario? If a provincial Ukrainian Canadian culture or identity cannot be demonstrated or is not to be emphasized, then Canadian regionalism alone explains the choice of a geopolitical unit like Ontario as an organizing principle for Ukrainian Canadian history.

However broad or narrow their scope, local histories serve a collective

need in that they legitimize the place of their subjects, who are also their primary audience, in the scheme of things. Ukrainian Canadian books performing this function also tend to celebrate their successes, stress their contribution to Canadian life, and pay homage to Canadian freedom and multiculturalism. In this, *Ukrainians in Ontario* is no different or worse than the many local histories, provincial or regional in focus, produced by prairie Ukrainians since the 1960s. In fact, it is better than some, while bringing a long marginalized area into the spotlight. Although the book will appeal most to Ukrainians in Ontario, especially those involved with the organized community, it contains useful material for researchers who wish to explore Ukrainian life in this particular province in greater depth.

Frances Swyripa
University of Alberta

Lubomyr Y. Luciuk and Bohdan S. Kordan. *Creating a Landscape: A Geography of Ukrainians in Canada*. Geoffrey J. Matthews, cartographer. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989. Unpaginated.

Published to commemorate the centenary of Ukrainian settlement in Canada in 1991–2, the above work is, as the authors state, “the first of its kind.” It reflects well the dominant interest of each scholar: the process of geographic migration (Luciuk) and political history (Kordan). The work consists of twenty-three pages of illustrated material—maps mainly but also bar and circle graphs, tables, drawings of Ukrainian Canadian church architecture and pictures—preceded in each case by a page of explanatory text.

Divided into five parts, the first on “The Homeland” consists of a map of twentieth-century Ukraine which reveals well its present and 1921 political boundaries and its historic ethnolinguistic boundary. The second part on “Immigration and Settlement” contains eleven maps and is the largest. The first map in this series shows the distribution of the three waves of Ukrainian immigrants to Canada, with the bar graph which depicts dramatically the absence of immigrants during both world wars and their rapid falling off during the Great Depression and after 1952 being particularly good. The other maps show the district, village, and kinship ties in Manitoba in 1901; the density of Ukrainian settlement in Canada in 1941, 1961; and 1981 (three maps); the extent of Ukrainian urban settle-

ment in 1961 and 1981 (two maps); the distribution to various parts of the world of the 250,000 Ukrainian refugees who remained in western Europe after the Second World War; the origins by last country of residence of the 14.5 per cent who were non-Canadian-born Ukrainians in 1981; and how "the Ukrainian cultural landscape in Canada" of 1981 was affected by interprovincial migration.

The remaining parts encompass "Cultural Characteristics," "Organizational Life," and "The Historical Experience." The first consists of a map on the use of Ukrainian as a mother tongue (1931–81) and as a home language (1971 and 1981), as well as three maps on religion: Ukrainians by religious denomination (1931–81); Ukrainian Canadian church architecture in Toronto, Edmonton, Insinger (Saskatchewan), and Shandro (Alberta); and churches and cemeteries (grave monuments) in the Dauphin-Sifton area of Manitoba. The section on "Organizational Life" shows the Prosvita halls (approximately 220) established during the pioneer and late interwar period; the branches of the eight major Ukrainian Canadian organizations; the Ukrainian Labour Farmer Temple Association/Workers' Benevolent Association, the Ukrainian National Federation/Ukrainian War Veterans' Association, the Ukrainian Self-Reliance League, the Brotherhood of Ukrainian Catholics, the United Hetman Organization, and the Canadian League for the Liberation of Ukraine; and a map of the branches of the Ukrainian Canadian Committee, the umbrella body formed in 1940 for the major Ukrainian organizations. The final part, "The Historical Experience," depicts internment operations, 1914–20; the type of institutions which usually characterized Ukrainian rural communities in Alberta before the Second World War; the concentration of the "No Vote" during the conscription plebiscite of 1942; and the major centers of Ukrainian population in the Canadian census of 1981. A list of selected references and an index of geographical place names complete the work. The book's jacket illustrates *Baking Easter Bread*, a 1968 painting by William Kurelek.

The book is a thoroughly competent piece of work. Full of facts, the work is very informative and the cartography is colorful and easy to understand. One might be disappointed that only Ukrainian Canadian church architectural style is depicted and that school districts, post offices and/or churches which carry Ukrainian place names in the prairie bloc settlements are not indicated (a la J. G. MacGregor, *Vilni Zemli* [1969] for the bloc in Alberta), but neither omission takes away from the book's overall value.

Marginally, it is usual to date Alberta's Edna-Star colony from 1892, not 1896 (Map 3); it is also strange to see Vancouver placed, alongside Toronto and Edmonton, among "the principal centers of Ukrainian-Canadian life" by 1961 (Map 6); and the oversight in referring to the Ukrainian Canadian Professional and Business Federation as the Ukrainian Professional and Businessmen's Association (Map 19) is unfortunate. So is the spelling of "bretheren" (Map 17). Much more serious is the occasionally sensational (and misleading) text which accompanies the excellent Map 20 on "Internment Operations, 1914-1920," the special cause of both authors. They point out that inmates were dissatisfied and in the escape attempts "several Ukrainian Canadians were killed," yet the bar graph on "internees" on the next page shows only four/five "Killed while escaping" with no evidence that any were Ukrainian. The use of single quotes around concentration camp also requires clarification since the same form is used for quoted material generally. Do the single quotes around concentration camp indicate that the term is used advisedly or were the camps officially labelled "concentration camps"?—in which case the source should be indicated. Finally, whether or not the internments "will have to be atoned for" (as the *Daily British Whig* [Kingston] suggested in 1917) is a position which pleases the authors, the leading statement should be seen for what it is, a leading statement.

Manoly R. Lupul
University of Alberta

Pavlo Zaitsev. *Taras Shevchenko: A Life*. Edited, abridged, and translated with an introduction by George S. N. Luckyj. Toronto, Buffalo, London: Published for the Shevchenko Scientific Society by the University of Toronto Press, 1988. xi, 284 pp.

This is a long-awaited English translation and edition by George Luckyj of Pavlo Zaitsev's *Zhyttia Tarasa Shevchenka* published in Ukrainian in the West in 1955. Zaitsev's work, although thirty-four years old, occupies a central position among the numerous biographies of Shevchenko, and is the most reliable source of biographical information and interpretation of the poet's life, works, and their relevance to modern Ukrainian thought. Even the most recent Soviet biography of Shevchenko, published in Kiev (1984), does not depart from previous ideological clichés and conceptual

and aesthetic simplifications of Shevchenko's world view and his works. Zaitsev's biography of the poet finds no place in Soviet *Shevchenkiana* and is mostly unknown to students and scholars in the Ukrainian SSR.

Luckyj's English rendering of Zaitsev's "most balanced and scholarly" (ix) biography preserves the "factual and intentional structure" (ix) of the original, but modifies the biographer's "narrative" and in places "compassionate" style. On occasion he condenses and abridges Zaitsev's prose and groups sixteen untitled parts of the book into five appropriately titled sections. Luckyj replaces M. Hlobenko's foreword and bibliography of the book's Ukrainian edition with his own updated introduction, selected bibliography of existing Shevchenko biographies, basic glossary, and an index of names and toponyms.

To avoid a disservice to Shevchenko's "untranslatable" poetry all of the poetic excerpts found in Zaitsev's book Luckyj renders in literal prose and only occasionally uses translations by Vera Rich, Watson Kirkconnell, and John Weir. As a source of reference he utilizes the six-volume edition of Shevchenko's works (not included in Luckyj's selected bibliography), and only in rare instances he refers to Zaitsev's Warsaw edition. The latter is due to the fact that in his Warsaw edition Zaitsev quotes his own Ukrainian translations of Shevchenko's Russian works.

In his introduction Professor Luckyj indirectly and often directly reveals his motives for undertaking the translation of Zaitsev's biography which coincides with Zaitsev's motives in assuming his Shevchenko project. In both instances the reason was Shevchenko's poetic artistry; his unique place in Ukrainian and world literature; his impact on social, cultural, and political thinking in modern Ukraine; and the poet's symbolic personification of Ukraine's historic experience. Therefore, Zaitsev's biography of Shevchenko is not only a fine mixture of heart and scholarly detachment but a most authoritative source of reference for literary students, scholars, and writers, and also students of social studies, particularly those in Ukrainian and Russian intellectual history of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Shevchenko's life story is a reflection of the social and political phenomena of the unfree and of the poet's cultural milieu, both Ukrainian and Russian.

To Luckyj's recognized contribution to this very turbulent era of ideas (*Between Gogol and Shevchenko*, *Shevchenko and the Critics*, and his work on Panteleimon Kulish) can be added another valuable source of reference for English-speaking scholars and students which could also serve as a

model for the second edition of Zaitsev's *Zhyttia Tarasa Shevchenka*. In the era of *perebudova*, such an edition should be made available to Shevchenko scholarship and educated readership in Ukraine.

Jaroslav Rozumnyj
University of Manitoba

Zenon E. Kohut, *Russian Centralism and Ukrainian Autonomy: Imperial Absorption of the Hetmanate 1760s-1830s*. Cambridge: Harvard Ukrainian Institute, 1988.

Denied access to Soviet archives, Zenon Kohut was obliged to base his doctoral dissertation ("The Abolition of Ukrainian Autonomy [1763-1786]: A Case Study of the Integration of a Non-Russian Area into the Empire") primarily on materials concerning the Ukrainian and Catherinean administrative reform published in Russia before 1917. Various professional commitments delayed publication of this dissertation, which he defended at the University of Pennsylvania in 1976. In the intervening period of about a decade, he has made good use of the time available to him to redefine and expand his project for the purposes of publication.

In the book he has sharpened the focus of his analysis by rigorously limiting his study to the Hetmanate and by making effective use of recent, international scholarship on Muscovite and imperial Russian administrative history and borderland policy, especially in the first two chapters on early Russian centralism in the borderlands, and on the nature of Ukrainian autonomy in the Hetmanate. The Muscovite state first applied a policy of centralism to a non-Russian borderland in the Volga region in the mid-sixteenth century. Kohut points out the remarkable extent to which the Muscovite state was able to assert administrative uniformity over the Cossacks and native peoples in this area. He suggests that Muscovy's success in dealing with the Volga native peoples can be attributed to the simplicity of government operations at that time. He does not comment, however, concerning a certain pragmatism in Muscovite nationality policy in the Volga region (a point Andreas Kappeler has made particularly well) and the extraordinary resiliency over the centuries of many Volga natives in resisting assimilation to the Russian language and way of life. In some ways the Ukrainians were less resilient than the Volga natives, even though they were better organized institutionally when Muscovy became

involved in their affairs in the mid-seventeenth century.

Russia's first encounter with a privileged, western borderland, and with "elements of corporate order and a strong sense of regionalism," (18) took place in the Hetmanate, or Left-Bank Ukraine. Ukrainian rights and privileges, Kohut emphasizes, were deeply ingrained in the collective identity of the Ukrainian gentry, Cossacks, clergy, and townspeople living in the Hetmanate in 1654. Yet Kohut's detailed discussion and description of Ukrainian rights and privileges and attitudes at that time indicates that the four groups of privileged Ukrainians were by no means united and that numerous and influential, talented individuals among them were powerfully drawn to either Polish civilization and *szlachta* society or to military, administrative or ecclesiastical careers in the service of the Russian tsar. Those who did choose to serve the tsar do not seem to have lost their sense of local, Ukrainian patriotism.

On the whole, privileged Ukrainian gentry, Cossacks, clergy, and townspeople would appear to have believed that their relationship with Russia was essentially contractual. They did not understand how difficult it was to reconcile their own views on Ukrainian autonomy with the Muscovite view of the terms of the treaty concluded at Pereiaslavl in 1654. As Kohut writes: "In a patrimonial state in which the tsar's authority was theoretically unlimited and everyone was his servant, if not his slave, there was no place for territorial privilege, corporate rights of social groups, Magdeburg Law, or the Lithuanian Statute—all elements essential to Ukrainian rights and liberties" (66–67).

The greater part of Kohut's study is devoted to Catherine II's clash with Ukrainian autonomy and the integration of the Hetmanate into the administrative and social system of the Russian Empire. Catherine's intention to reform Russian government and society and to impose rational administrative, fiscal, military, and social norms on the borderlands was hardly compatible with the idea of autonomy in a non-Russian area as large and important as the Hetmanate. The importance of cameralism and Enlightenment rationality for Catherine's Ukrainian policy is brought out very well by Kohut. He also shows the connection between this policy and the earlier efforts of Peter I to limit and control Ukrainian autonomy. It was a policy that Great Russians generally supported with considerable enthusiasm, as is illustrated by the evidence Kohut provides in his longest chapter on the Legislative Commission of 1767–8 (124–90).

Not every representative of Catherine's government in Ukraine, how-

ever, approved of disregarding local peculiarities and of moving hastily in imposing Russian norms on Ukrainian society. Governor-General P. A. Rumiantsev, for example, recommended a more gradual approach than that of Catherine to the Ukrainian question and favored adapting some norms to local conditions. Paul I restored certain traditional practices in the lands of the former Hetmanate during his brief reign, but these and other vestiges of former Ukrainian rights and privileges disappeared during the reign of Nicholas I in the wake of the 1830–31 Polish uprising, some fifty years after Catherine II had abolished the Hetmanate and decreed Russian administrative and social institutions for the Ukrainians.

My only reservation about this excellent, scholarly study of the imperial absorption of the Hetmanate concerns Kohut's explanation of the ineffectiveness of Ukrainian resistance to assimilation in the nineteenth century. Russian policy; similarity in language, religion, and historical background; the would-be incompatibility of Russian autocracy with regional autonomy; and the assimilation of traditional Ukrainian elites are all important but only partly explain this ineffectiveness.

Estonians, Finns, Latvians, and Lithuanians, having had no traditional elites of their own for centuries, created for themselves new native elites during the nineteenth century. They were able to become cultural, social, and even political nations largely because the leaders of Baltic German, Polish, and Swedish Enlightenment and the Lutheran and Roman Catholic churches made intelligent use of the human and financial resources of local society to defend regional interests and to teach literacy, build schools, disseminate practical knowledge, improve agricultural techniques, inculcate orderly habits of work and thought, offer models of social, political, and cultural organization, etc. The Russian nobility and Orthodox Church and the russified Ukrainian gentry, clergy, and townsmen did very little along these lines before the second part of the nineteenth century, which helps to explain why Orthodox Eastern Slavic peasants lagged so far behind "unhistorical" peoples in the west, such as the Estonians, Finns, Latvians, and Lithuanians. In Ukraine Catherine's form of "enlightened" rule only made matters worse by secularizing church wealth and by abolishing forms of local self-rule that might have otherwise permitted unprivileged Ukrainians to act on their own in preparing themselves for the modern world. Had they been in a position to do so, Russian centralizers would not have been happy, but they may have been obliged to compromise and to pursue a more pragmatic policy in dealing

with the Ukrainians, a policy they not infrequently followed elsewhere in the empire in trying to cope with challenges to central control on the part of Volga Tatars, Finns, Estonians, Baltic Germans, Lithuanians, and even Poles.

These comments are not intended to minimize the importance of what Kohut has accomplished in his book but reflect my own subjective reflections in response to the stimulation of the new materials and thoughts contained in his study. It provides an indispensable source of information concerning the political and social development of Ukraine and a reliable and perceptive guide for the study of Russo-Ukrainian relations from the 1760s into the third decade of the nineteenth century.

Edward C. Thaden
University of Illinois at Chicago

Jane Ellis, *The Russian Orthodox Church: A Contemporary History*. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1986. 531 pp.

From the October Revolution to the outbreak of World War II, Soviet religious policy had virtually deprived the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) of its institutional life. But Hitler's invasion of the USSR gave the ROC a new lease on life: Stalin decided to use the church to whip up patriotism and mass support for the war effort. So it was that in 1943, after three Russian Orthodox bishops had met with Stalin, the ROC was restored to official status. Loyal to the state, the church would be rewarded in the postwar period by a measure of toleration that would be interrupted only by a five-year period of persecution (1959–64) under Khrushchev.

Since the publication of Nikita Struve's *Christians in Contemporary Russia* in 1963, the study of the ROC has been enriched by two important monographs: Michael Bourdeaux's *Patriarch and Prophets: Persecution of the Russian Orthodox Church* (1975), and Dimitri Pospelovsky's *The Russian Church under the Soviet Regime, 1917–1982* (1984). To them must now be added an important contribution by Jane Ellis, Senior Researcher at Keston College, Kent.

Ellis' book is presented in two parts which cover the period from 1964 to 1985. In Part 1, the author describes the spiritual and administrative operations of the Moscow Patriarchate and some of the problems that are encountered in their fulfillment. Three chapters are devoted to the vari-

ous ecclesiastical cadres: bishops, clergy and the laity; three to parish, diocesan (or, more properly in an Eastern context: eparchial) and monastic life; in addition, theological education, publications, and church-state relations are treated in separate chapters. Part 2 traces the development of a dissident movement which began to emerge within the ROC in the late 1950s.

A key source for Ellis' discussion of ecclesiastical cadres was an internal government report on church affairs that was leaked to the West. It provides detailed information on the nature and extent of state control of church life in the USSR during the years 1968–74. The source of this report was the so-called Council of Religious Affairs (CRA), a complex bureaucratic instrument charged with ensuring that Soviet legislation on religion is obeyed and with overseeing the life of religious bodies in the USSR. Along with its far-reaching powers to sanction or prohibit religious activity at home, the CRA's mandate also includes an international extension.

From the very Patriarchate down to the laity, virtually every aspect of Russian Orthodox life takes place in the knowledge that "Big Brother is watching." The chapter on the bishops explains how the lives and activity of the sixty-seven Russian Orthodox bishops serving in August 1982 were approved, monitored, and controlled by CRA commissioners on the basis of loyalty assessments and ideological criteria. While the acute shortage of priests (in 1974, they numbered only 5,994, as compared with 7,062 registered parish churches) may be attributed in part to the anti-religious campaign of 1959–64, the role of the CRA in this sphere cannot be overlooked: any priest ordained without CRA consent could well expect difficulties in trying to obtain official CRA registration permitting him to exercise his priestly mission in a particular parish. Other state policies, such as above-average salaries for priests and unwavering support for corrupt priests, are used to bolster the anti-religious portrayal of the priest as a "relic of feudalism." The manipulative hand of the CRA is also evident in the control of theological education: the Council plays a direct role in the selection of candidates for the seminaries and in the recruitment of informers. As for the Russian Orthodox faithful, whose numbers Ellis estimates at between fifty-five and sixty million, despite constitutional guarantees of equality before the law, Ellis shows that discrimination on religious grounds in schools and in the workplace is routine and that it may be traced to the compulsory civil registration of baptisms, a practice

which enables CRA commissioners to identify the believers among local residents.

As in the case of the laity and the various clerical cadres, the various forms of religious community were also subjected to harsh repression under Khrushchev and, subsequently, to strict administrative controls by the CRA and local government agencies. The declining number of churches in the USSR, which began with the closure of an estimated 10,000 churches between 1959 and 1964, continued on to the mid-1980s. According to the current administrative procedures, parish communities can only be established after following a cumbersome bureaucratic process which involves at least three steps: official registration as a religious association (for which a minimum of twenty signatures is required), permission to register a building for worship, and obtaining the services of a duly registered priest. All of these arrangements, which must be completed under the auspices of the local CRA commissioner, entitle the community to only one thing: to worship within the walls of the building. Any other activity by the Christian community, whether inside or outside the church (such as religious education, or a ministry to the sick and needy), is prohibited.

In the chapter on monasticism, Ms Ellis discusses what is perhaps the area of severest religious repression in the USSR. In the three years that followed the Revolution of 1917, an estimated 1,105 Russian Orthodox monasteries and convents were destroyed. The 352 that remained were shut down by 1929. After World War II, there followed a sequence of sporadic revivals that were followed by new repression. In 1982, there were only six monasteries and ten convents functioning within the entire Soviet Union. Ellis' account of the state's repression of this sector of church life is a shocking expose that shows how the state extended its interference in church affairs far beyond administrative measures to outright physical brutality.

The publishing activity of the Moscow Patriarchate is yet another area over which the state retains complete control. All the printing presses used by the church belong to the state. The state also exercises control over religious publications by limiting the church's allotment of paper, by restricting the importation of religious literature from abroad, and through censorship.

The total control of virtually every aspect of Russian Orthodox life by the CRA begs the question about even the possibility of church-state rela-

tions. As Ellis puts it, "why does the ROC still exist?" Ms Ellis offers three possible reasons to explain how the Russian Orthodox Church has managed to survive in spite of institutionalized state interference. One is that religion in the USSR is marked by a special sort of resilience that allowed it to withstand perhaps the harshest religious repression of all time under Stalin. Another is the tactical consideration that a measure of toleration enables the state to claim that it allows freedom of conscience. The third explanation, and perhaps the most telling of the three, is that, if the state were to liquidate all religious institutions, religious activity would go underground, where it would be much more difficult for the state to control. Following from the state's record of maintaining far-reaching controls over the church, Ellis concludes that the state "would clearly prefer to have religious activity in the open, where it can see what is going on, and control and limit it." (p. 254)

Yet another explanation for the ROC's survival reached the West from an unexpected source: the church's own dissident wing. A *samizdat* report dated August 1979 and signed by Father Gleb Yakunin charged that the official church has completely abandoned its social mission and, as a result, it is no longer in tune with the religious needs of its people:

The Moscow Patriarchate in its present situation is incapable of reacting with animation to this process [of religious renewal], of strengthening it and directing it into a churchly channel. This process of religious renaissance is taking place apart from the Moscow Patriarchate, and moreover the tragedy of the situation lies in the fact that the Moscow Patriarchate, against its will, has become an objective obstacle on its path, a brake. (p. 280)

In essence, Yakunin was saying that the church had sold its conscience and soul to the state. In 1976, the organs of the state responded: the KGB unleashed a campaign of repression against this democratically-inspired movement within the ROC, thereby depriving it of some of its most outspoken members: Gleb Yakunin, Alexander Ogorodnikov, Vladimir Poresh, Dimitri Dudko, and others. These Orthodox dissidents had distinguished themselves from the official Russian church by protesting publicly against state control of religious life and by generating a profound debate about the future of their church and country.

The dedicated student of the current religious scene in the USSR is cau-

tioned against overlooking this book on the pretext that it predates the time of *perestroika*. Ellis' study is an indispensable, scholarly resource that provides a solid background to two pivotal decades of religious life in the USSR (1964–85), without which the current Soviet debate around the complex issues of church-state relations and religious freedoms can scarcely be appreciated.

Andrii Krawchuk
Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute

CONTRIBUTORS

BOHDAN KRAWCHENKO is the Director of the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies and Associate Professor of Slavic and East European Studies at the University of Alberta.

MYROSLAV SHKANDRIJ is Associate Professor of Slavic Studies at the University of Manitoba.

ANNA MAKOLKINA is a doctoral candidate in Comparative Literature, Research Fellow at the Centre for Russian and East European Studies, and the 1989–90 Northrop Frye Fellow at the University of Toronto.

ROMAN SOLCHANYK is Director of Program Research and Development at Radio Liberty, Munich, Germany.

ALEXANDRA KRUCHKA-GLYNN is a graduate student in the Department of English, University of Alberta who is specializing in the study of literature written in English by Ukrainian Canadians.

NOTE FOR AUTHORS

Contributions should be submitted in two copies and double-spaced throughout. A copy of the article or review on an IBM or Macintosh compatible disc should be provided. Notes should be placed at the end of the manuscript and the *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* uses the Library of Congress transliteration system. Articles should be from five to twenty-five double-spaced pages in length (2,000–10,000 words), and authors should include a brief biography with their submissions. Because of the changing orientation of the *Journal*, articles on current Ukrainian and Ukrainian Canadian topics will be given preference. The *Journal* does not consider articles that have been published or are being considered for publication elsewhere. The editors reserve the right to edit all submissions.

